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ABSTRACT
This paper reviews the course of fiscal policy and Social Security policy during the 1990s.   The
1990s witnessed two fundamental changes in U.S. fiscal policy: a dramatic improvement in the current
and projected budget balance, and a shift to a new political consensus in favor of balancing the budget
excluding Social Security rather than the unified budget.  The dramatic improvement in the budget
outlook stemmed both from favorable developments in the economic environment and from deliberate
policy actions that reduced budget deficits and later did not spend down the surpluses.
   In contrast, the 1990s did not witness significant changes in Social Security policy, although
alternative visions of Social Security reform received tremendous analytic and popular attention.  The
1994-1996 Advisory Council on Social Security presented three reform plans that placed important
emphasis on additional prefunding.  Each involved some form of investment in equities ￿ either centrally,
through the trust fund, or in a decentralized manner, through individual accounts.  Late in the decade, with
the emergence of on-budget surpluses, the possibility of general revenue contributions to the Social
Security system came under serious consideration. In the end, President Clinton decided to pursue Social
Security reform based on general revenue contributions to the trust fund and centralized investment in
equities rather than creating individual accounts, but his proposal was not adopted.
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Figures 861 The CBO was too pessimistic about FY1992: the unified deficit that year came in at
$290 billion.
1.  Introduction
The 1990s witnessed two fundamental changes in U.S. fiscal policy: a dramatic
improvement in the current and projected budget balance, and a shift to a new political consensus
in favor of balancing the budget excluding Social Security rather than the unified budget.  In
contrast, the 1990s did not witness significant changes in Social Security policy, although
alternative visions of Social Security reform received tremendous analytic and popular attention. 
This paper reviews the course of fiscal policy and Social Security policy during the 1990s,
including the economic and political forces that changed fiscal policy and left Social Security
policy largely unchanged. 
In January 1990 the Congressional Budget Office (CBO) projected that the unified budget
deficit would exceed $100 billion during the fiscal year then under way and would remain at
about that level for the following five years.  Two years later, the CBO projected that the budget
deficit would hit $350 billion in fiscal year 1992, fall by half over the following four years, and
then turn up again to pass $400 billion in 2002.
1  Yet, by January 2001, the budget had recorded
its third consecutive unified surplus, and the CBO projected that, under unchanged law, unified
surpluses would total more than $5.5 trillion over the next decade.  This dramatic in the budget
outlook stemmed both from favorable developments in the economic environment and from
deliberate policy actions that reduced budget deficits and later did not spend down the surpluses.
The second respect in which the fiscal landscape was transformed during the 1990s was
in the presumed standard for determining whether the federal government was living within its
means.  Until the past few years, debate and decisionmaking about the federal budget almost2
invariably were conducted in terms of the unified budget, and the fiscal objective was generally
assumed ￿ either implicitly or explicitly ￿ to be balance in the unified budget.  But in the summer
of 1999, buoyed by the progress of the preceding several years, the political consensus shifted
suddenly and dramatically to the objective of balancing the budget excluding the current
operations of the Social Security system, while aiming to put Social Security into 75-year
actuarial balance.  This change has had important implications for the political conversation
about the budget.  For example, in early 2001 Congress debated the disposition of roughly $3.1
trillion in projected on-budget surpluses over the next ten years rather than $5.6 trillion in unified
surpluses.  The disposition of roughly $2.5 trillion in projected Social Security surpluses
essentially was not disputed; virtually everyone assumed that they would be used to pay down
debt held by the public.
Changes of comparable magnitude did not occur in Social Security policy during the
1990s, although significant reforms of the program were debated at great length.  It has been
clear for some time that the aging of the U.S. population will eventually require significant
changes in Social Security revenues or benefits.  The reforms enacted in 1977 and 1983 set
payroll tax revenues above contemporaneous outlays, so that future benefits could be partly
prefunded through an accumulation of assets in the Social Security trust fund.  The 1994-1996
Advisory Council on Social Security presented three reform plans that placed important emphasis
on additional prefunding.  Each involved some form of investment in equities ￿ either centrally,
through the trust fund, or in a decentralized manner, through individual accounts.  Late in the
decade, with the emergence of on-budget surpluses, the possibility of general revenue
contributions to the Social Security system came under serious consideration.  In the end,3
President Clinton decided to pursue Social Security reform based on general revenue
contributions to the trust fund and centralized investment in equities rather than creating
individual accounts, but his proposal was not adopted.
The remainder of the paper explores these themes more closely.  The second section
summarizes the changing budget outlook, and the subsequent sections proceed chronologically
through a decade of fiscal policy and Social Security policy.
2.  Budget Outcomes and Projections
Figures 1 and 2 plot the unified federal budget surplus and federal debt held by the public,
both expressed as a share of GDP, since the end of World War II.  The improvement in federal
finances during the 1990s is striking.  Early in the decade, federal budget deficits exceeded
4 percent of GDP, and the debt held by the public reached nearly 50 percent of GDP for the first
time since the 1950s.  By the end of the decade, the budget had recorded its third consecutive
unified surplus for the first time since 1947-49, as well as the largest surplus relative to GDP
since 1948; debt held by the public had dropped below 35 percent of GDP.
Improved Budget Picture
Table 1 presents key budget data from the past fifteen years.  The table shows that the
remarkable improvement in the unified budget balance during the 1990s resulted from a
significant increase in revenue and a nearly equal decrease in noninterest outlays, both as shares
of GDP, together with the resulting impact on interest payments.  Tax revenue increased as a
share of GDP in part because of tax policy but also because of changing economic conditions; we4
return to both of these topics later.  Noninterest spending declined as a share of GDP in large part
because defense spending fell in nominal dollars and thus dropped sharply relative to GDP. 
The federal budget outlook beyond the 1990s also improved sharply during the decade. 
The CBO￿s first ten-year projection, published in January 1992, showed large and rising budget
deficits in the first years of the 21st century assuming that the law on the books in 1992 was
maintained.  Further, the CBO￿s first 75-year budget projection, released in May 1996, showed
public debt exceeding GDP by 2020.  In contrast, the CBO￿s ten-year projection in January 2001
showed large and rising budget surpluses during the next decade; it also showed the public debt
being eliminated (on a net basis) in fiscal year 2009.  Moreover, the 75-year projections released
in October 2000 showed net public indebtedness below zero through 2050.  The CBO
summarizes its very long-run projections in terms of an estimated ￿fiscal gap,￿ which is the
immediate, permanent tax increase or spending decrease needed to keep public debt below its
contemporaneous size relative to GDP for the 75 years following the date of the projection.  In
May 1996 this gap was 5.4 percent of GDP; by October 2000 the gap had shrunk to 0.8 percent
of GDP.
To be sure, some analysts believe that the assumptions underlying these projections are
too optimistic.  Auerbach and Gale (2000) argue that, over the next decade, discretionary
spending is not likely to fall further as a share of GDP and that the number of people affected by
the alternative minimum tax (AMT) will not be allowed to increase by a factor of 10 ￿ both of
which are implicit in the CBO projections.  The CBO itself notes that the fiscal gap could be
substantially larger under alternative assumptions about health care costs and long-term
productivity growth. That said, for the purpose of assessing the extent of fiscal improvement over2  Between January 1998 and January 2001, the CBO increased its estimate of
productivity growth during the 10-year budget window by nearly 1 full percentage point.  On the
other hand,  the latest long-run outlook from the CBO also includes a substantial increase in the
projected rate of health spending growth.
5
the last several years, the relevant question is whether the assumptions underlying the projections
have become more optimistic in the last few years, and if so, by how much.  Although it is
difficult to judge, we believe that the change in the projections likely provides a reasonable
measure of the progress that has been made.
2  
Sources of Improvement
We explore the timing and sources of the budget improvement in several ways.  Figure 3
shows the CBO￿s surplus and deficit projections in January of 1990, 1993, 1995, 1998, and 2001. 
As can be seen, the budget picture deteriorated between 1990 and 1993, but improved steadily
thereafter.
This improvement stems from a variety of positive developments.  The CBO parses the
revisions to its projections into the contributions of legislative factors (i.e., policy changes),
economic factors (i.e., changes in aggregate economic conditions such as productivity growth
and inflation), and technical factors (essentially a residual category showing the total budget
change that cannot be attributed to the first two categories).  The most important technical factor
in the late 1990s was a surge in tax revenue relative to GDP beyond the increase that would be
expected given our progressive tax code.  The CBO (2000) attributed this surge to a combination
of factors: an increase in corporate profits and workers￿ wages and salaries relative to GDP, an
increase in the share of income received by people in the highest tax brackets, and a surge in6
capital gains from the booming stock market.  Indeed, individual income taxes rose from 8.1
percent of GDP in 1995 to 10.2 percent in 2000, even though no significant tax increases were
enacted between those years.  Another important technical factor during the late 1990s was a
sharp deceleration in federal health spending beyond that which was predicted based on changes
in Medicare policy.
We present our summary of the CBO￿s revisions in table 2.  We total the revisions
between each pair of projection dates shown in figure 3.  Each column pertains to a fixed budget
window.  For example, column 1 shows the cumulative revisions between 1990 and 1993 in
surplus projections for fiscal years 1991 through 1995, the 5-year budget window for which
projections were released in January 1990.  For the other pairs of years, the revisions apply to the
ten-year budget window following the first year in that pair; for example, the revisions between
1998 and 2001 apply to fiscal years 1999 through 2008.  In order to decompose the revisions into
policy, economic, and technical factors, we cumulate the decompositions presented in each of the
CBO projections published between the two end points, typically three projections per year.
Before discussing our results, we note four ways in which these calculations likely
understate the role of policy actions during the 1990s.  First, the most significant policy actions
were taken early in the decade when the nominal amounts of revenues and outlays were smaller
and the budget window was shorter; this tends to downplay the true importance of these actions
compared with the favorable developments later in the decade.  Second, because the CBO does
not retrospectively re-estimate policy effects, it may have underestimated the role of some
specific policy changes in the 1990s.  For example, the increase in the top income tax rate in
1993 may have raised more revenue than expected because the CBO considerably3 Of course, people who faced higher tax rates after 1993 might have reported even higher
income in the absence of the policy change.  Feldstein (this volume) elaborates on this point.
4 It is worth emphasizing that the CBO￿s ￿no-policy change￿ baseline projections assume
that discretionary spending grows with inflation and therefore shrinks over time relative to GDP.
Under a baseline that assumed that discretionary spending would remain constant relative to
GDP, the policy category would receive credit for the fact that discretionary spending declined
relative to GDP over this decade.
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underestimated the share of income that would be received by people in the highest tax brackets.
3 
And health spending slowed much more sharply after the 1997 reforms than anticipated, perhaps
because the reforms had more bite than the CBO realized.  Third, the policy actions presumably
played a role in improving economic conditions and thereby contributed to the positive economic
and technical factors.  Fourth, the relative lack of policy actions in the face of large and growing
surpluses in the late 1990s could be viewed as an active contribution of policy, because the
political system had previously aimed simply to balance the unified budget.  We return to the
third and fourth issues later.
4
Table 2 presents the results, which we summarize here and discuss in greater detail in our
chronology of the decade.  During the early 1990s, budget projections deteriorated as the
substantial deficit-reduction actions in the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1990
(OBRA90) were more than offset by weaker-than-expected economic growth, higher-than-
expected federal spending on health programs, and the ballooning cost of dealing with failing
thrift institutions.  However, the projections in early 1993 represented the nadir.  The passage of
the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1993 (OBRA93) reduced projected budget deficits
substantially, and￿in contrast with OBRA90￿had the good fortune to be followed by several
years in which economic and technical factors had little net effect on the budget outlook rather5 According to the CBO, OBRA93 reduced projected budget deficits by more than $400
billion over five years and by more than $1500 billion over ten years.  The former figure was
central in the political discourse of the time, but the latter figure is consistent with the current
focus on ten-year budget windows and therefore is shown in our table.
8
than causing it to deteriorate substantially.
5  Even so, in January 1995, the CBO was still
projecting rising deficits under current law.  Three years later, the outlook was much better: the
beneficial effects of the Balanced Budget Act of 1997 (BBA97) and other policies, coupled with
very large gains in both economic and technical factors, produced a forecast of imminent
surpluses.  By January 2001, the budget picture had again improved dramatically, owing to
positive economic and technical revisions of an astounding magnitude. Policy actions in the late
1990s were scored as reducing projected surpluses; the most prominent of these actions was the
sharp increase in late 2000 in the discretionary spending caps.  However, the CBO tally does not
incorporate the effects of President Clinton￿s ￿Save Social Security First￿ strategy (discussed
below) which arguably allowed hundreds of billions and perhaps trillions of dollars of surpluses
to flow through to pay down debt, rather than being used for additional spending or tax cuts.
A final perspective on the improving fiscal situation during the 1990s is provided by
figure 4.  This figure decomposes the difference between the CBO￿s January 1993 projection and
the actual outcome (or the 2001 projection for the years beyond 2000). Thus, whereas table 2
cumulated revisions between several pairs of projection dates, figure 4 shows cumulative
revisions relative to a single projection date, 1993.   During the years around the turn of the
century, policy changes contributed about one-quarter of the total improvement, with the rest
nearly evenly split between economic and technical factors.  Over the entire period between 1994
and 2000, actual outcomes were roughly $2.6 trillion better than the CBO￿s 19939
projection￿and policy changes accounted for one-third of this improvement.  Moreover, as
discussed earlier, this estimate should be seen as a lower bound on the true contribution of
policy, in part because it omits all contributions from potential surplus-dissipating actions not
taken.
In sum, the remarkable improvement in the budget outlook during the 1990s can be
attributed in substantial part to policy actions taken and avoided.  But it also occurred in
important measure because of an economic boom that surpassed expectations, higher tax revenue
than would have been anticipated given overall economic conditions, and slower-than-expected
growth in health costs.  We turn now to a chronological review of developments in budget and
Social Security policy during the decade.
3.  Budget Deficit Reduction: 1990 through 1997
In 1985, rising concern about large federal budget deficits led to passage of the Gramm-
Rudman-Hollings deficit-reduction law, which set explicit annual deficit targets that declined to
zero over several years.  When the target proved too difficult to meet in 1987, the targets were
raised.  Thus, when the 1990s began, the size of federal deficits￿and the apparent inability of
the political process to reduce them￿were central features of the political landscape.
OBRA90
In the spring and summer of 1990, President Bush and the Congress debated and
negotiated alternative routes to deficit reduction.  These initial discussions were inconclusive,
despite the President￿s expressed willingness to increase taxes as part of a broader budget10
package (which ran counter to the view expressed by many Republicans).  However, the Iraqi
invasion of Kuwait and deteriorating economic conditions seemed to provide additional impetus
to the desire to ￿put our fiscal house in order,￿ and President Bush and the Congressional
leadership announced a budget agreement on October 1st.  Yet, the House of Representatives
voted down the plan by a wide margin four days later, again throwing the budget picture into
disarray.  Indeed. this initial failure of the long-term budget deal created a short-term problem as
well: a temporary appropriations bill lapsed, shutting down most of the government for a long
weekend.  In late October, Treasury Secretary Nicholas Brady stated that President Bush was
open to a rate increase on upper-income taxpayers.  Several days later, the Congress approved an
altered plan for deficit reduction as OBRA90.
According to the CBO￿s projections, OBRA90 reduced the deficit by nearly $500 billion
over five years compared with then-current law.  This accomplishment had an important effect
on the fiscal outcomes of the 1990s and on the fiscal situation faced by the incoming Clinton
administration several years later.  In two key respects, the plan represented an approach to
deficit reduction that differed significantly from that used in the late 1980s and that became a
model for fiscal constraints in the 1990s.  First, the plan included a set of specific actions to
reduce the deficit, rather than a set of deficit targets.  This new approach did not require
incremental fiscal stringency in response to a slowing economy.  This was important because it
preserved the functioning of the automatic stabilizers, and it avoided forcing the Congress to
tighten the budget precisely when doing so would be most politically painful.
Second, the plan introduced a new set of budget enforcement rules designed to deter
legislative actions that would worsen the deficit.  One rule was a  ￿pay-as-you-go,￿ or ￿paygo,￿11
constraint on taxes and entitlement spending: any tax cut and any increase in entitlement
spending would need to be offset by an equal amount of tax increase or entitlement spending
reduction.  Another aspect of the enforcement system was ￿caps,￿ or limits, on discretionary
spending over the following several years.  The caps were set so that they increased by less than
expected inflation, thereby squeezing down real discretionary spending over time.  Because
discretionary spending is ultimately determined in annual appropriations bills, this approach
allowed policymakers to defer some difficult deficit-reduction decisions; nevertheless, the caps
were adhered to for a time, and in combination with the prevailing determination to shore up the
nation￿s fiscal foundations, likely contributed to the improvement in the budget situation.
OBRA93
During his campaign for the Presidency, Bill Clinton argued that America needed to
tackle both the budget deficit and the ￿public investment deficit.￿  His economic plan Putting
People First explained:
￿Our strategy puts people first by investing more than $50 billion each year over the next
four years to put America back to work￿the most dramatic economic growth program
since the Second World War.  Our strategy recognizes that the only way to lay the
foundation for renewed American prosperity is to spur both public and private
investment.  To reclaim our future, we must strive to close both the budget deficit and the
investment gap. . . .To pay for these investments and reduce our national debt, we will
save nearly $300 billion by cutting spending, closing tax loopholes, and requiring the very
wealthy to pay their fair share of taxes.  Our plan will cut the deficit in half within four
years and assure that it continues to fall each year after that￿ -- Putting People First (page
7)
This plan ultimately evolved into OBRA93.6 In fact, about half of the stimulus outlays were scheduled to occur during fiscal year
1993, which was already underway and which preceded the 5-year budget window.
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The First Clinton Budget
In February 1993, the Clinton administration put forward its first budget document, ￿A
Vision of Change for America.￿  President Clinton enunciated his economic strategy this way:
￿My plan has three key elements: economic stimulus to create jobs now while laying the
foundation for long-term economic growth; long-term public investments to increase the
productivity of our people and businesses; and a serious, fair, and balanced deficit-
reduction plan to stop the government from draining the private investments that generate
jobs and increase incomes.￿  -- A Vision of Change cover letter
The administration described its budget over five years as follows: First, the budget included
$328 billion of revenue increases, $329 billion of non-interest spending cuts, and $46 billion of
reduced debt service, for ￿gross deficit reduction￿ of $704 billion.  The tax increases included a
new top income tax bracket, removal of the wage cap for Medicare taxes, and a broad-based
energy tax based on the energy content (measured in BTUs) of fuel consumed.  The spending
reductions included cuts in Medicare provider reimbursements, defense spending, and a range of
nondefense discretionary spending, along with an extension of the discretionary spending caps
and paygo rules of OBRA90.  Second, the budget proposal included $144 billion of additional
￿investment outlays,￿ which we discuss shortly.  Third, the plan had $77 billion of ￿tax
incentives,￿ including a significant expansion of the Earned Income Tax Credit.  Lastly, the plan
had about $15 billion of ￿stimulus outlays.￿ Overall, therefore, the plan was projected to provide
nearly $500 billion of net deficit reduction.
6
Woodward (1994) and Reich (1997) provide accounts of the behind-the-scenes
development of the Clinton budget.   Both sources emphasize the ongoing conflict between the13
desire for deficit reduction and the desire to provide both short-term economic stimulus and long-
term public investments.  We turn to these issues now. 
Deficit Reduction and Economic Stimulus
Traditional economic analysis of deficit reduction implies that reducing government
spending or increasing taxes depresses economic activity in the short run but by raising saving
and investment boosts productivity and the overall productive capacity of the economy down the
road.  However, an alternative view of the short-run effect of deficit reduction was developed in
the 1980s by Blanchard (1984) and Branson (1985) among others.  The idea is straightforward:
an expectation of lower future deficits reduces future short-term interest rates, and these lower
future short-term rates generate lower current long-term interest rates.  Lower long-term interest
rates could stimulate business investment and other interest-sensitive spending immediately,
offsetting at least some part of the direct contractionary effect of deficit reduction.  The net effect
on short-run output depends in part on the size of the reduction in the current deficit compared
with the expected reduction in the future deficit.  Indeed, the 1984 Economic Report of the
President (pages 40 and 41) invoked this line of reasoning a decade earlier in arguing that a
credible phased-in deficit reduction plan would not hamper economic growth even in the short
run.  This argument is basically the standard ￿crowding out￿ view of fiscal policy run in reverse:
greater fiscal restraint should lower interest rates and thereby ￿crowd in￿ private activity.  The
novel twist is that the stimulus from the lower interest rates might be elicited even before the
contractionary impact of actual cuts in spending or increases in taxes had been felt.14
Yet as of 1993, this theory was largely untested, and President Clinton received differing
advice about its likely importance.  Some members of the economic team believed that long-term
interest rates were unusually high because of expectations about the federal deficit, and that
altering those expectations would bring down long-term rates and thereby stimulate economic
growth.  Others argued, however, that reducing the deficit would likely slow the economy and
￿cost jobs￿ in the short run, although it would increase private investment and productivity over
time.  While these advisers acknowledged the possibility that a decline in long-term interest rates
would cushion the economy from some of the direct contractionary effect of deficit reduction,
they tended to view a full offset as a long shot.  The uncertainty about the short-run effect of
deficit reduction continued throughout the year.  A July 15th memo to the President from the
Council of Economic Advisers reportedly noted that the economy was weaker than had been
anticipated and that the budget plan then working its way through Congress was more
contractionary in direct terms than the President￿s original proposal.  Nonetheless, the
administration retained its public commitment to deficit reduction.
Public Investments
A key element of President Clinton￿s campaign platform was targeted increases in public
spending.  The detailed description of the economic plan referred to a significant increase in
infrastructure investment, the creation of a civilian research and development agency to
encourage conversion of a ￿defense-based economy to a peacetime one,￿ a nationwide network
of community development banks, additional police officers, ￿empowering those on welfare by
providing education, training and child care,￿ fully funding the Head Start and Women, Infants15
and Children (WIC) programs, a Youth Opportunity Corps, greater availability of subsidized
college loans, and guaranteed health benefits for all Americans.  Indeed, the first Clinton budget
stated: ￿Deficit reduction at the expense of public investment has been and will continue to be
self-defeating.  The Clinton plan is explicitly and emphatically aimed at reducing the deficit
while increasing much-needed public investment￿ (page 10).
Nevertheless, increasing these outlays was clearly at odds with the objective of reducing
the budget deficit, and the deterioration in deficit projections in late 1992 heightened this
conflict.  While the President￿s economic team was united in believing that both public
investments and deficit reduction were important, different members of the team put different
weights on the two objectives.  Moreover, the President￿s political advisers were said to be
generally quite critical of the focus on deficit reduction, viewing the proposed outlays as the
objectives over which they had fought the election.
In the end, the additional outlays proposed during the campaign were whittled down very
substantially.  The President was reported to have been torn ￿ determined to rectify a perceived
deficit in public investment in both physical and human capital, but also believing that the best
way to gain the ability to address that agenda was to first get control of the fiscal situation.  And
Robert Rubin (then Director of the National Economic Council and later Treasury Secretary) said
near the end of the administration that President Clinton had understood the potential stimulative
effects of lower budget deficits and lower interest rates: ￿Clinton said, ￿I have a jobs program,
and my jobs program is deficit reduction￿￿ (New York Times, 12/25/00).  Ultimately, the
President￿s budget included only part of the new outlays proposed during the campaign, and only
a fraction of that amount was contained in the final legislation.  In particular, while new funding7 A $4 billion bill extending unemployment compensation, which had been part of the
stimulus package, was passed separately.
16
was provided for the Earned Income Tax Credit, Head Start, and WIC, the proposed
infrastructure spending was largely abandoned,.
Passage of OBRA93
President Clinton presented his budget in mid-February.  Several days later, Alan
Greenspan testified before the Senate Banking Committee, commenting that ￿the President is to
be commended for placing on the table for debate￿ a ￿serious￿ and ￿plausible￿ economic plan. 
Newspaper stories interpreted Greenspan￿s remarks as essentially endorsing Clinton￿s overall
strategy while staying removed from the specifics.
About one month later, the House of Representatives approved a budget resolution based
on the framework of the administration￿s deficit-reduction plan, though as noted above the
resolution included only a fraction of the public investments that Clinton had proposed. 
Separately, the House then passed the stimulus package as well.  The Senate followed by passing
a budget resolution that was similar to the House￿s, but balked at the stimulus package.  After an
extended filibuster, Clinton announced in mid-April that he would withdraw the stimulus
package.
7  Shortly thereafter, the proposed BTU tax also ran into heavy resistance, especially in
the critical Senate Finance Committee.  In early June, Treasury Secretary Lloyd Bentsen said
publicly that there would not be a BTU tax.
The House and Senate passed separate budget plans by very narrow margins in May and
June, but the outcome of the conference process was still very uncertain.  Finally, in August, the8 See Blinder and Yellen (2001) and Rubin (this volume) for endorsements of this view.
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House approved a deficit-reduction plan by a 218-to-216 vote, with all Republican members
voting against and nearly all Democrats voting in favor.  The next day, the Senate passed the bill,
on a vote of 50-50, again with all Republicans voting against, and with Vice President Al Gore
casting the tie-breaking vote in favor of passage.  President Clinton signed this bill into law as
OBRA93.
What Did Deficit Reduction Ultimately Accomplish?
Throughout the debate on OBRA93, sharply differing views were expressed about the
economic implications of the package.  A number of the harshest critics prophesied that a
recession would surely result if the budget framework were enacted.  As it turned out, economic
growth accelerated in 1994, and the second half of the 1990s witnessed an extraordinary
economic boom.  What role did deficit reduction play in this success story?  That is inherently a
difficult question to answer, but we believe that the fiscal discipline launched by OBRA90 and
OBRA93 made an important contribution to the 1990s economic expansion.
8
Most notably, the expansion was characterized by a remarkable surge in investment,
especially in business equipment and software.  Between 1990 and 2000, outlays in this category
increased at an average annual rate of more than 10 percent in real terms.  Several factors likely
contributed to this explosion, including strong output growth, robust profits, and rapid
technological progress.  But investment was also supported by the sharp reduction in federal
government deficits that left more resources available for private use.  Indeed, we think it likely18
that both technical advances and greater national saving were necessary for the investment boom
that the country enjoyed, and that neither alone would have been sufficient.
Figure 5 shows net national saving (that is, total saving less capital depreciation) and its
components as shares of GDP during the past 20 years.  The turnaround in the federal budget
caused saving to be about 7 percent of GDP higher than it would have been if deficits had
remained at their 1992 level.  Between 1992 and 1997, a decline in saving by households,
businesses and state and local governments offset some of the rise in federal saving, but national
saving still increased by almost 3 percent of GDP.  After 1997, a sharp drop in non-federal
saving more than offset the continued increase in federal saving, and national saving declined.  
Although a Ricardian might view the decline in private saving as a response to the additional
federal saving, the consensus view attributes that decline primarily to the dramatic runup in stock
prices.
An alternative indication of the effect of deficit reduction can be gleaned from the path of
interest rates over the course of 1993.  Interest rates reflect the balance of supply and demand in
the market for loanable funds.  A reasonable presumption is that the private demand for funds
was, if anything, increasing over the course of 1993 as the economic recovery gathered strength. 
Even so, market interest rates declined during 1993, suggesting that the net supply of funds (after
federal government demands had been satisfied) must have been seen as increasing.  Moreover,
the day-to-day timing of the decline in interest rates aligns well with news about the prospects for
passage of OBRA93 (see the discussion in the 1994 Economic Report of the President). 
The significant increase in the nation￿s capital stock generated by the investment boom of
the 1990s benefited the economy in several ways.  First, it helped to raise productivity: labor19
productivity increased nearly twice as fast between 1995 and 2000 as between 1975 and 1995.
Second, it helped contain inflation: the rate of change in the price index for personal
consumption expenditures excluding food and energy drifted downward through most of the
decade, even as the strength of the economic expansion increased.
The improvement in the federal budget balance did not end the large deficits in
international trade that the United States began to run during the 1980s.  At that time, popular
discourse linked the burgeoning budget and trade deficits together as the ￿twin deficits,￿ and not
without reason: as a matter of arithmetic, domestic investment must be financed either by
domestic saving or foreign saving.  Therefore, assuming no change in domestic investment, a
decline in domestic saving resulting from a larger government deficit must be offset by more
foreign saving.  But foreigners save by exporting more goods and services to us than we send to
them ￿ in other words, by causing us to run a larger trade deficit.  Thus, the popular moniker of
￿twin deficits￿ was valid as far as it went, but it failed to account for changes in domestic
investment.  And, as we have noted, one of the most dramatic developments in the 1990s was a
surge in domestic investment, to such an extent as to overwhelm the increase in domestic saving
and require an increase in the supply of funds from abroad.
The Republican-Controlled Congress
The most prominent federal policy issue between the fall of 1993 and the fall of 1994 was
the Clinton administration￿s proposal for national health care reform.  This proposal is discussed
at length by Cutler and Gruber (this volume).  Here we simply note that one concern about the
administration plan￿both inside and outside the administration￿was its likely effect on the20
budget deficit.  Indeed, when the CBO released its analysis of the administration proposal, it
estimated that the proposal would, on balance, increase the deficit.  No comprehensive health-
care reform plan passed the Congress in 1994.
Then, in the 1994 election, Republicans won majorities in both the Senate and the House
of Representatives.  The Republican leadership said that it had a mandate for a multi-part
platform known as the ￿Contract with America.￿  The planks in this platform called for large tax
cuts, line-item veto power for the President, a constitutional amendment requiring a balanced
federal budget, and the elimination of the budget deficit by 2002.
In 1995, Congressional Republicans tried to implement these policies.  The House
approved a balanced-budget amendment in January ￿ by nearly a 3-to-1 margin ￿ but the
Senate rejected the amendment in March, as support fell just short of the two-thirds majority
needed.  The House and Senate also approved line-item veto legislation that would have given
presidents the ability to reject individual items in spending bills without vetoing entire bills.
Although Clinton signed the legislation into law, the Supreme Court struck down the law as an
unconstitutional delegation of Congressional authority to the executive branch. Both houses of
Congress also passed bills cutting spending by $16 billion in the fiscal year then under way.  And
both houses passed budget resolutions in May laying out broad frameworks for balancing the
budget by 2002.
The Clinton administration responded to the Contract with America in part by trying to
occupy the political center.  Thus, the administration￿s budget included small middle-class tax
cuts as well as various spending cuts that, taken together, provided a small net reduction in
projected budget deficits.  President Clinton attacked the balanced budget amendment and21
charged that the Republicans￿ proposed ￿deep cuts in federal spending amount to war on
children￿ (New York Times, February 25, 1995, page 1).  He cast his first veto as president to
reject the legislated cuts in current-year spending, although he later approved a revised package
of cuts totaling the same amount.  Then, in June, Clinton outlined a plan to balance the budget by
2005.  By achieving balance more gradually than the Republicans, using the more optimistic
projections of the Office of Management and Budget rather than the CBO, and including smaller
tax cuts than the Republicans, the administration reduced the scale of the required spending
reductions.  In particular, the administration emphasized that the Republican plan would have
entailed much larger cuts in Medicare and Medicaid than the administration￿s plan.
As budget negotiations stretched into the fall, Congressional Republicans tried to force
the administration to accept their budget framework using two different strategies.  One strategy
was based on appropriations bills, and it resulted in two government shutdowns.  By mid-
November, only three of the thirteen appropriations bills for the fiscal year already under way
had been passed.  The continuing resolution (CR) that was funding the agencies not covered by
those three bills was expiring, and the Republicans refused to pass a further CR without
concessions on the overall budget plan that the administration refused to make.  All ￿non-
essential￿ workers in those agencies were then furloughed for six days, until President Clinton
accepted the Republicans￿ goal of balancing the budget in seven years and the Congress
approved another CR.  Yet, negotiations broke down again by mid-December, and most of the
federal government was shuttered for another three weeks.  Eventually, the Republicans
abandoned this strategy in January 1996.22
The Congressional Republicans￿ second strategy, pursued simultaneously with the
appropriations battle, was based on the statutory limit on federal debt.  The government was on
track to exceed the debt limit by November; doing so would have caused the government to
default for the first time in history, because it would have been unable to borrow sufficient funds
to meet its obligations.  The administration defeated this strategy by taking a variety of complex
steps to keep the officially measured debt below the statutory limit while still carrying on the
government￿s activities.  In mid-November, Treasury Secretary Rubin ordered the suspension of
new investments for the federal employees￿ defined-contribution retirement plan and the early
redemption of some bonds held by the civil service defined-benefit retirement fund.  In mid-
February, with the impasse over the debt limit still continuing, Rubin suspended investment of
Treasury￿s Exchange Stabilization Fund, redeemed additional securities prior to maturity from
the civil service retirement fund, and authorized a set of asset exchanges among a government
trust fund, a government corporation, and the Treasury.  Some members of Congress criticized
these actions, and Representative Gerald Solomon called for Rubin￿s impeachment.  In the end,
default was avoided, the debt limit was finally increased in March 1996, and the assets of these
various funds were restored to what they would have been absent these maneuvers.
By April 1996, President Clinton and the Congress essentially agreed to disagree: they
passed a modest budget package that funded the government at close to current-law levels and
made small changes in tax policy.  Many observers believed that President Clinton had won the
battle over the shutdown and had staked out the political center as a fiscally disciplined
moderate.23
BBA97
According to projections available in early 1997, deficits under then-current law would
persist and eventually increase again, despite the sharp improvement in the fiscal outlook during
the preceding several years.  In February 1997, the administration put forward a budget designed
to achieve balance in five years.  Negotiations between the administration and Congress stalled
until mid-March, when House Speaker Newt Gingrich expressed his willingness to scale back
Republican tax-cut plans.  Budget talks resumed in early April, and a deal had nearly been
reached on an overall budget framework by May 1.  Then the CBO told the administration and
Congressional leadership that it was reducing its projection of budget deficits over the following
five years by $225 billion.  Taking advantage of that last-minute windfall, negotiators announced
the outline of an agreement the next day.  Filling in the details of that outline proved to be a
contentious undertaking.  After two weeks of haggling, a complete budget deal was announced
on May 15.  But passing the specific bills needed to implement that deal involved further
sparring and, eventually, compromise.  At the end of July, the Taxpayer Relief and Balanced
Budget Acts of 1997 passed by wide margins in both the House and Senate, and were signed into
law by President Clinton in early August.
The CBO estimated that this legislation would produce much less deficit reduction than
OBRA90 or OBRA93, but would lead to a balanced unified budget in 2002.  Outlays were
trimmed by nearly $200 billion over the following five years, including a reduction in payments
to Medicare providers and a modification and extension of the discretionary spending caps.  But
taxes were cut by about $80 billion over the five-year period, including several new tax credits
favored by the administration and a cut in the capital gains tax rate favored by Republicans.  In9 More than half of the five-year reduction in outlays was scheduled to occur in FY 2002,
the target date for deficit elimination.  Moreover, the net tax cut in FY 2002 was only about half
of the net tax cut in either FY2001 or FY2003, owing to shifts in the timing of tax obligations.
10 CBO (1997) presents deficit projections for 2030 that range from 8 percent to 17
percent of GDP.  The lower estimate assumes that discretionary spending grows at the rate of
inflation, and therefore shrinks substantially as a share of GDP, and that there is no economic
feedback between the budget deficit and other economic variables.  The higher estimate assumes
that discretionary spending remains constant as a share of GDP, and that￿by soaking up national
saving that otherwise would have been available for investment in productive plant and
equipment￿the deficit reduces economic growth.
24
retrospect, this law may have trimmed outlays by more than the CBO anticipated, because
Medicare spending fell well below CBO projections in subsequent years.
9
4. Entitlement Reform and Saving Social Security First
Throughout the 1990s, many institutions, analysts, and commissions sounded the alarm
about longer-term fiscal issues.  The annual reports of the Social Security and Medicare Trustees
projected that both systems were significantly out of actuarial balance, and would eventually
require reform; new long-run budget models from OMB and CBO predicted exploding levels of
debt after 2010; and generational accounts calculated both inside and outside the government
showed large tax burdens on future generations.  For example, the Social Security Trustees
projected in 1997 (Board of Trustees, 1997) that Social Security outlays would rise from 11
percent of payroll in 1997 to 20 percent of payroll in 2075, requiring a 50 percent increase in the
payroll tax if no other changes were made.  At the same time, the CBO projected that total
government expenditures would exceed revenues by as much as 17 percent of GDP in 2030 and
that public debt would reach 100 percent of GDP in 2030.
10  Generational accounts published in11 See Auerbach, Gokhale and  Kotlikoff (1994) for a description of these estimates.
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the 1993 federal budget suggested that lifetime net tax rates would have to rise from 34 percent
to 71 percent to sustain then-current fiscal policies.
11
The primary causes of these projected long-term imbalances were￿and continue to
be￿rising medical costs and the aging of the population.  Declining fertility and rising life
expectancy imply that the ratio of workers to beneficiaries will fall from 3:1 to 2:1 between 2000
and 2030 (Board of Trustees, 2001). Because longevity gains and low fertility rates are expected
to persist, this is not simply a temporary phenomenon associated with the retirement of the baby
boom generation, but rather the leading edge of a new plateau.  Moreover, spending on medical
care is projected to rise faster than GDP for decades to come due both to population aging and to
the adoption of new medical technology.
Entitlement Commissions
Three important commissions on entitlement reform during the 1990s considered changes
in Social Security: the Bipartisan Commission on Entitlement and Tax Reform co-chaired by
Senators Bob Kerrey and John Danforth, the 1994-1996 Advisory Council on Social Security
chaired by Edward Gramlich, and the 1997-1998 National Commission on Retirement Policy co-
chaired by Senators John Breaux and Judd Gregg and Congressmen Jim Kolbe and Charles
Stenholm.
Kerrey-Danforth26
In order to secure Senator Kerrey￿s decisive vote for the 1993 budget agreement,
President Clinton agreed to create a commission on entitlement reform and appoint the Senator
as chairman.  The commission set for itself the goal of developing a package of revenue and
spending measures that would bring Social Security into long-run balance and hold the unified
budget deficit at its 1995 level relative to GDP in the long run.  In December 1994, the
commission issued a staff report summarizing entitlement and tax reform options.  The Social
Security options included raising the age of eligibility for full benefits, reducing cost-of-living
adjustments and spouses￿ benefits, subjecting more benefits to taxation, and diverting a portion
of the Social Security payroll tax into mandatory private retirement accounts.  Not all of these
options would have been required to bring the system into balance, but they are representative of 
the approaches that were generally under consideration at the time.  The Medicare options
included imposing a new monthly premium for beneficiaries and increasing the deductible from
$100 to as much as $1200.  The options on the revenue side included eliminating deductions for
state and local taxes and for charitable contributions.
A majority of commission members voted against the proposals ultimately put forth by
Senators Kerrey and Danforth (Bipartisan Commission, 1995), and Congressional leaders and
administration officials distanced themselves from the commission￿s findings.  For example,
incoming House Speaker Newt Gingrich responded to the proposals by saying ￿I think Social
Security is off the table for the foreseeable future.  We have so many other more pressing and
more immediate problems and we ought to focus on the ones that are immediate, not the ones
that are 20 years out￿ (Washington Post, December 12, 1994, page A8).  White House Chief of
Staff Leon Panetta stated that the administration was opposed to any proposal for reducing Social12 Senator Danforth retired from the Senate at the end of 1994.
13 By tradition, the quadrennial advisory councils in turn sponsored technical review
panels that examined the assumptions and methods underlying the Trustees￿ estimates of
actuarial imbalance.  The 1994 legislation making Social Security an independent agency
eliminated the quadrennial advisory councils and replaced them with a more permanent advisory
board.
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Security spending (Washington Post, December 15, 1995, page A18).  Nonetheless, Senator
Kerrey and commission member Senator Alan Simpson went on to introduce Social Security
reform legislation based on the commission￿s work.
12  The Kerrey-Simpson bills gradually raised
the early retirement age from 62 to 65 and the age of eligibility for full benefits to 70, reduced
cost of living adjustments for Social Security, and shrank benefits for spouses.  The legislation
also permitted 25 percent of the Social Security trust fund to be invested in private-sector stocks
and bonds, and gave workers the option of diverting 2 percentage points of their payroll tax
payments to individual investment accounts in exchange for lower Social Security benefits.
Social Security Advisory Council
Secretary of Health and Human Services Donna Shalala appointed the second major
commission, the 1994-1996 Advisory Council on Social Security, in response to a legal
requirement that an advisory council be empaneled every four years to review the Trustees￿
estimates and comment on relevant policy issues.
13  This particular advisory council was given an
usually broad mandate and charged with reviewing Social Security￿s long-run financing, the
equity and adequacy of benefits, and the relative roles of the public and private sectors in the
provision of retirement income.  The 13-member committee was chaired by Edward Gramlich
and followed the traditional practice of including three representatives from organized labor,14 Schieber and Shoven (1999) provide a fascinating account of these discussions.
15 In addition to the issues we highlight, the advisory council also reached a consensus on
restructuring Social Security family benefits, extending mandatory coverage to all state and local
government workers, extending the period over which the indexed annual wage is computed,
accelerating the increase in the age of eligibility for full retirement benefits, and revising the
income taxation of Social Security benefits.  See 1994-1996 Advisory Council (1997) for details.
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three representatives from the employer community, and other experts.  The council intended to
complete its work by the end of 1995, but the breadth of its mandate and the contentious nature
of its discussions led it to delay its final report until January 1997.
14  
The members of the advisory council came to consensus on three key issues.
15  First, there
should be substantially more advance funding of Social Security￿s long term obligations in order
to boost national saving.  Second, equity investments should play an important part in Social
Security reform.  And third, reform should not only meet the traditional goal of bringing the
system into 75-year balance, but also leave the ratio of the trust fund to annual benefits stable at
the end of the 75-year period.  However, council members disagreed quite strongly about the way
in which these changes should be implemented, splitting into three factions with different
recommended solutions for Social Security￿s long-run financing problem. 
Six of the thirteen council members, led by former Social Security Commissioner Robert
Ball, favored a plan that aimed to preserve the present Social Security benefit structure as much
as possible.  The key feature of this plan was investing 40 percent of the Social Security trust
fund in equities instead of the special Treasury bonds traditionally held by the trust fund. 
Because equities are projected to earn a higher expected return than bonds, this change in the
trust fund￿s portfolio would be scored as achieving 75-year solvency with relatively small16 In the final report, the supporters of this plan did not actually recommend equity
investments.  Instead, they wrote that the plan ￿envisions, after a period of study and evaluation,
the possibility of large-scale investment of [Social Security trust fund] monies in the equity
market in order to help bring the program into balance.￿  There was no recommendation for
eliminating the actuarial imbalance if equity investments were not ultimately pursued.
17 Gramlich (1998) explains the reasoning behind this plan.
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changes in revenues and benefits.
16  To prevent the system from ultimately drifting out of
balance, the plan also proposed raising the payroll tax by 1.6 percentage points beginning in
2045.
Two members, led by council chairman Gramlich, proposed adding individual accounts
on top of the existing Social Security system.  In contrast with the Kerrey-Simpson individual
account proposal, this plan maintained the entire 12.4 percent payroll tax for the traditional
defined-benefit program, which meant that its benefit cuts did not have to be as deep.  The
individual accounts were to be funded by mandatory additional contributions of 1.6 percent of
covered payroll, which it was hoped would represent additional national saving.  Individuals
would choose how to allocate their account balances among a limited number of equity and bond
index funds.
17
Five council members, led by Sylvester Schieber and Carolyn Weaver, proposed much
larger individual accounts.  They suggested that 5 percentage points of the payroll tax be diverted
to individual accounts; another 5 percentage points would provide a flat benefit to all retirees at
about two-thirds of the poverty line; and the remaining 2.4 percentage points would be used to
continue survivor￿s and disability insurance.  Additional tax revenue equal to 1.5 percent of
payroll for the next 75 years would be needed to fund the transition to this system.18 Another reason why the report was so valuable was that it incorporated a great deal of
analytical material developed under the direction of Harry Ballantyne and Steve Goss, Chief
Actuary and Deputy Chief Actuary, respectively, at the Social Security Administration, as well as
by the members of the technical review panels.
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The Gramlich Commission struggled to reach consensus around a single plan, but
eventually published a final report that reflected these three starkly different visions of Social
Security reform.  Ironically, the commission may have been considerably more valuable for not
having reached consensus, because its analysis of these three alternatives served as a valuable
launching pad for future analysis, including the work of Clinton administration staff.
18  It is also
worth noting that, despite the divisions on the commission, the majority of members supported
some sort of individual accounts as part of Social Security.  Thus, the idea of individual accounts
had, in a few short years, made a remarkable transition from the white papers of libertarian think
tanks to the mainstream policy debate.
Breaux-Gregg-Kolbe-Stenholm
Unlike the first two commissions, the Center for Strategic and International Studies￿
National Commission on Retirement Policy was not government-sponsored, although its co-
chairs Senators Breaux and Gregg and Congressmen Kolbe and Stenholm were committed to
introducing the commission￿s ultimate recommendations in legislation.  The group was launched
in January 1997 and released its proposal in May 1998.  It recommended diverting 2 percentage
points of the payroll tax to create individual accounts.  To rectify the imbalance in the traditional
system (made even deeper by the carve-out of tax revenue), the plan raised both the normal and
early retirement ages, assumed that further cost-reducing changes would be made to the19 The other important piece of Social Security legislation during this period was
introduced by Senator Moynihan.  It proposed to cut the payroll tax and gave workers the option
of using the tax savings to fund an individual account, in which case their contribution would be
matched by the employer share as well.  The plan also included various benefits cuts and, in the
long run, increased the payroll tax to 13.4 percent of payroll.
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consumer price index, and reduced benefit levels by altering the formula that translates lifetime
earnings into benefits.  In order to shield low-income households from some of the benefit cuts,
the plan introduced a new minimum benefit for workers with at least 20 years of earnings.  This
benefit increased from 60 percent to 100 percent of the poverty line as a worker￿s years of
earnings increased from 20 to 40, so a household headed by a worker with 40 years of earnings
would never fall below the poverty line.
Despite the persistent belief during this period that current fiscal policy was not
sustainable in the long run, none of these proposals came close to being enacted.  Quite
understandably,  the need to reform a system that was projected to remain solvent for at least




Within the White House, serious consideration of tackling long-run entitlement issues
began in the middle of 1997.  During the preparations for his second inaugural address, President
Clinton had told his advisers that he wanted to make strengthening Social Security one of his top
goals for his second term.  In addition, Congress was insisting on creating a Medicare
commission as part of the 1997 budget agreement, and the administration needed to decide how
to respond.  Most important, the administration realized that its next budget projections would32
include substantial unified surpluses between 2002 and 2007.  Because these surpluses would fall
within the ten-year budget window, the administration would need to propose a policy for
allocating them.
This imminent end to the era of deficits was viewed by the administration as creating both
opportunities and dangers.  On one hand, the availability of surpluses gave the administration the
freedom to contemplate new ambitious goals.  On the other hand, President Clinton had
successfully headed off Republican calls for deep tax cuts during the previous five years by
calling for fiscal responsibility and deficit reduction.  In an era of surpluses, it was harder to see
what strategy would be more popular than Republican tax cuts, which were viewed by the
administration as likely to have adverse distributional consequences and to reduce national
saving at a time when the country should be saving more to prepare for the retirement of the
baby-boom generation.
Political Pressures
The administration￿s economic team met throughout the summer and fall of 1997 to
consider tax reform options, strategies for the new surplus era, and entitlement reform.  Although
these meetings initially were conducted on separate tracks, it was realized eventually that these
topics were closely related, and the three topics were merged into a single set of ￿special issues￿
meetings that focused on ways to use the projected surpluses.
At an early point in this process, the President￿s health advisers argued that fundamental
Medicare reform should not be pursued aggressively.  These advisers believed that the
combination of population aging and rising health costs per beneficiary made Medicare￿s long-33
term financing problems too large to resolve at that time.  They also felt that the 1997 budget
agreement already embodied many of the steps that the administration was ready to embrace with
respect to Medicare reform.
Fundamental tax reform was also viewed as having substantial political and economic
risks.  First, if the President opened the door to a major tax bill, the administration might well
lose control of the process to Congress.  Then, a flat-tax plan with significant revenue loss (and
therefore a negative effect on national saving) and adverse distributional consequences could
have become the focus of the debate.  Second, any reform that simplified the tax code or
encouraged saving to a significant degree would likely create millions of losers as well as
millions of winners, even with the commitment of substantial surplus funds.  Lastly, no particular
tax reform proposal ever gathered momentum among the economic team.
In contrast, there was considerable enthusiasm among the economic team for undertaking
Social Security reform.  This enthusiasm stemmed in part from the plausible reform alternatives
laid out by the Gramlich Commission and in part from the Rooseveltian legacy for the President
that would come from putting Social Security on secure ground for the coming century.  But the
President￿s advisers also believed that proposing to use the surpluses for Social Security reform
was more likely than the other alternatives to block both tax cuts and new spending.  Thus
reforming Social Security could do double duty ￿ helping to solidify the improving budget
outlook￿President Clinton￿s most important economic accomplishment￿by permitting the
projected surpluses to feed through to national saving, and facilitating the rejuvenation of the
nation￿s most important social program.  Indeed, the economic team believed that even in the20 The numbers in this paragraph are taken from the 2001 Trustees￿ Report. 
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likely event that the reform effort failed, the debate over Social Security reform would be healthy
in and of itself, and could go a long way toward maintaining fiscal discipline.
The administration￿s economic team was also aware of a significant group within the
Democratic Party that downplayed the need for Social Security reform, partly in order to prevent
radical change in the program.  This group emphasized that, under the Social Security Trustees￿
low-cost assumptions, the system remains solvent throughout the 75-year projection period. 
Given this possibility that the existing system might be viable, why open the Pandora￿s box of
￿reforming￿ the crown jewel of American social programs?  The administration￿s economists
gave less weight to this argument for two reasons.  First, the low-cost projections assume that a
large number of factors such as fertility growth, mortality rates, immigration, and economic
growth all turn out much better than expected￿which presumably has very low probability. 
Second, recent research by academic demographers (for example, Lee and Tuljapurkar, 1998)
suggests that longevity would likely increase more rapidly than projected by the Social Security
Trustees, which would raise the costs of the program.  Thus, the distribution of possible
outcomes seemed weighted toward a worse, not a better, financial situation than projected by the
Trustees.  
In a similar way, some observers noted that the Social Security Trustees￿ assumption of
1.6 percent annual GDP growth in the long run was far below the 3.1 percent annual average
growth experienced in the last 30 years, and argued accordingly that the Trustees were being
much too pessimistic about growth.
20  This argument missed the point that the growth of the
labor force is projected to slow from its current pace of about 1 percent per year to approximately35
zero when the baby-boom generation begins retiring in earnest.  GDP growth can be decomposed
into the sum of the growth of the labor force (the number of workers) and the growth of
productivity (output per worker).  The Social Security Trustees are assuming that productivity
growth in the long run will roughly match its 1.5 percent annual historical average.  With the
growth of the labor force dropping to about zero, productivity growth would have to roughly
double from its historical average rate in order for GDP growth to be maintained at its historical
average pace.  Moreover, faster economic growth has limited ability to improve Social Security￿s
finances in the long run because a retiree￿s initial level of Social Security benefits is indexed to
aggregate wage growth during his or her working years.  It is only because benefits after
retirement are indexed to inflation rather than wages that economic growth improves the actuarial
standing of the system.
National Saving
The goal of increasing national saving was central to the administration￿s thinking about
Social Security reform.  Conventional wisdom indicates that the nation should save more now in
preparation for the retirement of the baby boom generation.  With lower fertility and rising
longevity, the output generated by each worker will need to support the consumption of a larger
number of workers and retirees in the future than it does today.  The nation can smooth
consumption in the face of this rising dependency burden by setting aside a larger share of
current output as saving, thereby increasing the future capital stock and making future workers
more productive.  36
Despite this rationale, the economic case for increasing national saving is less clear cut
than one might think.  The fundamental issue is whether current generations should consume less
in order to increase the well-being of future generations.  In the absence of population aging,
determining the optimal amount of saving involves balancing two considerations.  On one hand,
because future generations will benefit from gains in productivity over time, they are likely to be
substantially better off than current generations.  On the other hand, because foregone
consumption compounds at the marginal product of capital, it is relatively inexpensive for
current generations to provide additional resources for future generations.
Population aging introduces three additional considerations into the analysis.  First, the
increase in the dependency ratio caused by population aging will reduce the standard of living of
future generations relative to what it would be without population aging, suggesting that
additional resources should be transferred to future generations and therefore that additional
saving would be desirable.  Second, the slowdown in population growth will increase the capital-
labor ratio, and therefore depress the return on capital; the lower return on capital suggests that
less saving would be desirable (Cutler, Poterba, Sheiner and Summers, 1990).  Elmendorf and
Sheiner (2000) use simulations to quantify these effects and conclude that the United States
probably should not undertake substantial additional saving in response to the anticipated
demographic shock.  A third consideration is that tax rates would have to rise significantly over
time to fund current-law benefits on a pay-as-you-go basis.  For example, current projections
imply that the Social Security payroll tax rate would have to rise from its current level of 12.4
percent to about 18 percent by 2070, an increase of roughly half.  Since deadweight loss rises37
with the square of the tax rate, economic efficiency would be increased by raising taxes on
current workers in order to decrease required future tax rates.
Quite aside from issues of population aging, many economists believe that a number of
factors are causing U.S. national saving to be too low.  For example, households may be short-
sighted in their preparation for retirement, government policies may discourage saving by
imposing a tax on capital income (interest, dividends, and capital gains), pay-as-you-go
retirement programs like Social Security may crowd out private saving, and positive externalities
from capital accumulation may drive the social return to saving above the private return.
It is very difficult to predict the impact of a given Social Security reform plan on national
saving.  For example, if budget policy is made with the aim of balancing the unified budget, any
increase in Social Security surpluses will result simply in additional spending or tax cuts in the
non-Social Security part of the budget.  Similarly, households may respond to Social Security
reform by changing their own saving in ways that offset additional saving generated directly by
the reform plan.  Elmendorf and Liebman (2000) estimate the effect on national saving of seven
different approaches to Social Security reform and show that the effects of alternative reforms
depend critically on how households and the rest of the federal budget respond to reform.
Saving Social Security First
Before the January 1998 State of the Union address, the administration￿s economic team
presented President Clinton with three options for pursuing Social Security reform.  The first was
to make a surprise announcement of a complete reform plan in the State of the Union address. 
The second was to name a commission to produce a reform plan in a short time, with the aim of38
engaging the Republican leadership in high-level negotiations in Spring 1998.  The third was to
launch a year of public education, with the aim of releasing a proposal after the fall 1998
Congressional elections, possibly in the 1999 State of the Union address.
As work progressed, the discussion ultimately focused on two possibilities.  One was to
allocate a specific percentage of the surplus to the Social Security trust fund and announce the
date to which trust fund solvency would be extended by this action; the other was to reserve the
entire surplus pending Social Security reform.  The administration viewed the first proposal as a
more dramatic announcement and an approach that would free up the remainder of the surplus
for other priorities.  But reserving all of the surplus was seen as a simpler and more sustainable
message than announcing that some seemingly arbitrary fraction should be reserved.   Moreover,
it avoided the risk that a specific proposal to allocate surpluses to the trust fund would serve
simply as a lightning rod for criticism and end up reducing the chance of achieving reform.
The administration ultimately adopted the second option, a strategy that became known as
￿Save Social Security First.￿  In the State of the Union address, President Clinton announced that
his budget would reserve all of the projected unified budget surpluses pending Social Security
reform.  This strategy did not mean that the entire surplus would necessarily be used for reform,
but rather that the President would not support other uses of the surplus￿either for tax cuts or
spending increases￿until reform was accomplished and it became clear how much of the surplus
was needed to finance that reform.  Thus, the policy was intended both to preserve the projected
surpluses in case they were needed to finance the transition to a more fully funded Social
Security system, and to provide the reward of being able to use the remaining surpluses for tax
cuts or more spending as an incentive to Congress for tackling Social Security reform.21 ￿Opt-out￿ plans ￿ in which individuals could choose whether to remain in a scaled back
version of the current system or to allocate instead a share of their payroll tax to individual
accounts -- were considered particularly risky because high-income individuals might
disproportionately opt out of the current system, turning it into a welfare program and depriving
it of universal political support.
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President Clinton also launched a year-long national dialogue, including bipartisan
forums designed to educate the public that would culminate in a December 1998 White House
conference.  At the first of these forums, in Kansas City, the President presented five principles
that he said should guide Social Security reform: 1) strengthen and protect Social Security for the
twenty-first century; 2) maintain universality and fairness; 3) provide a benefit people can count
on; 4) preserve financial security for low-income and disabled beneficiaries; and 5) maintain
fiscal discipline.  The principles were designed to rule out proposals for radical privatization,
including opt-out plans
21, and proposals that would adversely affect low-income beneficiaries. 
The President also made clear that all reform options other than an increase in the payroll tax rate
should be on the table.  Throughout the year, President Clinton accepted the advice of his
economic team and did not rule out an eventual increase in the normal retirement age.  
Moreover, the President consistently maintained that individual reform elements should not be
judged in the abstract, but rather as components of complete plans, and that those plans should be
evaluated against the principles he laid out in Kansas City. He thought that by providing cover
for those who were willing to make politically unpopular proposals for Social Security reform, he
could increase the chance that reform would ultimately be accomplished.40
5.  Social Security Reform Options
After the 1998 State of the Union address, the administration launched a systematic
process to develop a Social Security reform plan.  A working group jointly chaired by National
Economic Council Director Gene Sperling and Deputy Treasury Secretary Lawrence Summers
met once or twice nearly every week to develop and analyze reform options.  These working
group meetings culminated in meetings with the economic team principals roughly once every
three weeks, and in intermittent meetings with the President that increased in frequency in
advance of key decisions.
In order to be prepared for the debate that was expected to arise, the working group
studied a wide range of reform options￿including many that the administration opposed.  To be
clear, the President never determined whether there was any plan built around individual
accounts that he could have supported.  To our knowledge, he never gave any of his advisers a
brief for negotiations with Congress, and the administration certainly was never on the verge of
striking a deal.  The President￿s advisers rejected all plans for individual accounts that would
have diverted resources away from the traditional defined-benefit program ￿ so-called carve-out
plans.  Whether a so-called ￿add-on￿ plan could have garnered the support of the President is
impossible to know.  It was clear that any such plan would have put strict limits on the extent to
which an individual￿s overall benefit might be at risk from poor investment results, in line with
one of the President￿s principles for Social Security reform.  Similarly, the administration would
have put considerable emphasis on the redistribution accomplished under a proposed reform plan
￿ again in line with one of the President￿s principles ￿ and might well have insisted that a
reformed system be more progressive than the current one. 41
The working group studied analytic issues that cut across various reform options. Most of
the analysis focused on two broad topics: mechanisms for using the projected budget surpluses to
pre-fund Social Security benefits, and mechanisms for investing those pre-funded amounts in
private financial assets.  Much of the effort ultimately was directed toward devising ways of
bridging the gap between defenders of the current defined-benefit system and advocates of
individual accounts, including hybrid plans that included features of both approaches.
Relatively little time was spent analyzing traditional reform options such as raising the
retirement age, adjusting the indexation of benefits, or changing the tax status of benefits.  This
lack of attention largely reflected the familiarity of these options, owing in part to the analysis
conducted by the Gramlich Commission.  What was new in the current situation was the
availability of additional resources, in the form of emerging surpluses, that might be used to
reduce the pain of putting the system on a sound footing.  Moreover, it did not make much sense
to focus on specific revenue raisers and benefit cuts until the President had settled on a particular
approach to reform.  Lastly, the administration believed that the specific painful elements of a
Social Security deal would need to be introduced at the last minute as part of bipartisan
negotiations with Congress.  The administration￿s view was that any specific painful options put
forward before a complete deal was reached would be attacked, and responsible policies would
be taken off the table prematurely.
Using Projected Budget Surpluses as Part of Social Security Reform
There were two principal challenges in using near-term budget surpluses to help pay long-
term Social Security benefits.  The first challenge was to set aside the money today in a way that42
would actually boost the resources available to future generations, rather than being dissipated
down the road by future Presidents and Congresses.  The second challenge was to ensure that the
incremental future resources would actually be used to finance retirement benefits.
Maintaining budget surpluses ￿ and thus paying down public debt ￿ was seen as the most
direct way to boost national saving, but by itself this approach had several shortcomings.  First, it
was not clear how to give Social Security a claim on the additional future resources that would be
made available by paying down the debt.  Second, this strategy would pay off the entire public
debt long before Social Security was fully prefunded, raising the question of how the ensuing
￿national asset￿ should be invested.  Third, it was difficult to see how this strategy could be
locked in for any length of time: if future Presidents and Congresses decided to use the surpluses
for tax cuts or new spending, then these resources would not be available as planned.
These concerns led the administration working group to devise a set of reform plans that
involved transferring some portion of the unified budget surplus to the Social Security trust fund. 
Mechanically, these plans transferred funds from the non-Social Security part of the federal
government to Social Security.  If written into law, these transfers would have given Social
Security a legal entitlement to future resources, and would have ensured that any later diversion
of the surpluses to other purposes would have had an adverse implication for the Social Security
trust fund.  The transfers were also designed to take projected surpluses ￿off the table,￿ so that
they could not be allocated to tax cuts or new spending, but would be used to reduce the public
debt.
One important disadvantage of these plans was their vulnerability to the charge of
￿double counting￿ the Social Security surplus.  Much of the projected unified budget surpluses22 In the Clinton White House, ￿bad optics￿ meant simply ￿did not look good.￿
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originated in Social Security and therefore were already credited to the Social Security trust fund
under current law.  Thus, according to the critics, transferring unified surpluses to Social Security
caused the same dollars of revenue in effect to be counted twice to the benefit of Social Security.
Yet, the status quo involved precisely the same approach to budgeting: as long as the budget
process was focused on balancing the unified budget, dollars that were credited to the Social
Security trust fund were still perceived to be available for new spending or tax cuts.  The
administration￿s economic team believed that a dollar of the unified budget surplus could
therefore legitimately be transferred to Social Security and credited to the trust fund, provided
that the dollar would take the dollar off the table and prevent it from being used for other
purposes.  In that case, the transfer would result in an extra dollar￿s worth of public debt being
paid down relative to the status quo, and therefore in an extra dollar of government saving.
Nevertheless, the administration was well aware that this approach had ￿bad optics￿, and
internally a number of economists argued vigorously against adopting a plan that would be
subject to this criticism.
22  However, the obvious alternative of taking Social Security out of the
budget and transferring only non-Social Security surpluses to the trust fund was not a strong
alternative at this point because the non-Social Security part of the budget remained in deficit. 
Thus, this approach would have imposed too much fiscal stringency and would have required the
administration to give up talking about its proudest economic accomplishment, the unified
budget surplus, and instead report an on-budget deficit.23 See Penner (1998) for a discussion of budget scoring issues that arise in Social Security
reform plans.
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Another disadvantage of this approach was the need for novel budget accounting in order
to truly take the surpluses ￿off the table.￿
23  Under conventional budget scoring, a dollar
transferred from the non-Social Security part of the budget to Social Security would not reduce
the unified budget￿so the amount of surplus apparently available for tax cuts or new spending
would not actually be reduced.  Therefore, the administration proposed a new scoring rule in
which every dollar transferred from the non-Social Security budget to the Social Security trust
fund would result in a one-dollar reduction in the reported unified surplus.   There was
considerable internal debate over whether such a scoring rule would be sustainable, or whether
some future President or Congress would revert to conventional scoring methods and erase the
incremental government saving that would be achieved under this type of approach.
Investments in Private Financial Assets
Beginning with the Gramlich Commission, nearly all Social Security reform proposals
involved some investments in private financial assets.  Yet this consensus left a wide gap
between those favoring individual accounts and those favoring collective investing through the
Social Security trust fund.  During the late 1990s, Henry Aaron, Peter Diamond, Robert
Reischauer and others emphasized the high administrative costs and portfolio risks associated
with individual accounts, and they devised mechanisms to protect collective investment systems
from political interference (Aaron and Reischauer, 1998, Diamond, 1996, 1997, 2000).  On the
other side, Martin Feldstein, Andrew Samwick, and others argued that individual accounts need45
not involve high costs or risks, and were the most effective way of pre-funding Social Security
benefits (Feldstein and Samwick, 1997, 1998).  The analysis conducted within the administration
built upon this academic work and extended it significantly along four dimensions:
administrative feasibility and costs, portfolio risk, political interference in markets and corporate
governance, and redistribution.
Administrative Feasibility and Costs
Peter Diamond had shown that administering individual accounts had been very
expensive in Chile and the United Kingdom, and argued that costs might also be high in the
United States.  In particular, he pointed out that an annual administrative cost of 100 basis
points￿similar to many U.S. mutual funds today￿would reduce the retirement income available
to an individual with 40 years of work history by roughly 20 percent.  In order to ensure that the
economic team￿s advice to the President would be accurate and did not promise something that
could not be achieved, Lawrence Summers insisted that the working group determine whether
setting up an individual accounts system was even remotely feasible, what kind of service it
could provide, and at what cost. 
The information technology staff at the Treasury Department and the Social Security
Administration were given the task of determining exactly how information and dollars would
flow from workers￿ earnings statements to private investment managers.  Extremely detailed
estimates were produced of how much additional manpower would be necessary for such a
system to function.  For example, one option was for workers to indicate their choices of private
sector fund managers on their 1040 tax forms.  The working group went so far as to determine46
how many digits would be needed for each fund￿s ID number and therefore how many key
strokes would be required to enter all of the ID numbers each year.  Separate estimates of cost
and necessary manpower were produced depending on whether the processing would occur by
May of each year (sharply increasing IRS workload during its peak period) or by early August
(which was much cheaper).
Two principal considerations were how long it would take to get a system up and running
and whether the system could provide service similar to what many workers now experience in
the 401(k) plans offered by their employers.  On the first issue, it was considered important from
a political standpoint that the system be up and running before President Clinton left office in
early 2001.  However, the information technology teams throughout the government were busy
with Y2K preparations, so it did not seem possible that substantial resources could be devoted to
setting up individual accounts until after those preparations were completed.  At one point in
mid-1998, consideration was given to starting the process of setting up the administrative
structure for individual accounts right away, a year before there was any chance of a plan being
enacted by Congress, so as to shave a year off the time between enactment and the existence of
the accounts.
On the issue of service quality, a major concern of the working group was whether
contributions could be made to individual accounts in a timely manner.  Employers do not report
their workers￿ annual earnings until the first quarter of the following year; it then takes the IRS
several months to process and reconcile these earnings records, so it is typically August before a
mostly complete set of earnings records for the previous year is available.  The working group
thought that it would be unappealing for account contributions to be made as much as 18 months47
after the earnings on which they were based.  Options were developed for making estimated
contributions to accounts based on workers￿ previous years￿ earnings, or for investing all of the
funds in a default portfolio and then allocating them to individual accounts (including the within-
year returns) when the information on individual earnings became available.
Yet, the working group remained very concerned that any feasible, inexpensive individual
account system would be perceived as providing inferior service compared with employer-run
accounts.  Because the cost of a system of individual accounts depends mainly  on the number of
accounts, rather than the amount invested in them, the existence in a public system of millions of
very small accounts could generate administrative costs that were much larger on a ￿load￿ basis
than for employer-run systems.  Minimizing those costs would generally require a reduction in
service and flexibility relative to those private systems.  Thus, Lawrence Summers was fond of
saying that we had to guard against the risk of setting up the Post Office when people were used
to dealing with Federal Express.
The working group concluded that managing a system of individual accounts would be
feasible, but that the government would have to play a major role in the system and only bare-
boned accounts could be administered at a reasonable cost.  In particular, the government would
have to collect the revenue and set up a clearinghouse to direct deposits to the private sector fund
managers selected by each worker.  Other options such as having workers send contributions
directly to fund managers or mandating that employers administer the accounts would be
prohibitively expensive.  One way to reduce costs was to allow people no investment choice until
their accounts reached a minimum size (perhaps $5000); until then the funds would be invested
collectively.  Moreover, the range of investment choices would need to be sharply limited,  to48
perhaps a dozen firms offering broad-based index funds.  Account statements would be mailed at
most once a year, and phone inquiries would not be toll-free.  Borrowing against account
balances would be prohibited, partly to preserve the balances exclusively for retirement use, and
partly because load administration has proved very costly in the private sector.
The working group￿s best estimate was that such a system could be run at an annual cost
of $20 to $30 per account, while accounts with service similar to that in current 401(k)s (though
not including loans) would be two or three times as expensive.  With roughly 180 million
accounts, total annual costs could exceed $5 billion a year in today￿s dollars (more than half as
large as the current budget of the IRS and therefore more than half the cost of administering the
entire federal tax code) and tens of thousands of new government workers would be needed to
answer phone inquiries and process worker choices of fund managers.  Thus, even though
administering an individual account system was thought to be feasible, administrative costs
remained a significant downside to that approach.  The group also believed that it was important
that costs be spread across all accounts in proportion to their assets; otherwise a very substantial
share of the investment returns of lower-income people with small account balances would be
consumed by the administrative costs.
Portfolio Risk
Social Security reform plans that involve investment in equities could introduce two sorts
of portfolio risk.  First, aggregate stock-market fluctuations could leave different cohorts with 
higher-than-expected or lower-than-expected retirement income.  Second, retirement income
could differ among members of the same cohort if individuals were allowed to make their own49
investment choices.  The extent of these risks varies considerably across different reform plans. 
Collective investment by the trust fund would produce no variation in benefits among members
of the same generation, and￿to the extent that there is some mean reversion in equity
prices￿could smooth some of the risk across generations as well.  On the other hand, individual
accounts with relatively unrestricted IRA-style investment options could result in substantial
numbers of ill-informed investors making very different investment choices.  As a result, two
individuals born in the same year and with identical earnings histories might retire with very
different benefits because they assumed different idiosyncratic risks or because aggregate stock-
market fluctuations had affected them differently.
The economic team emphasized to President Clinton the portfolio risks under different
reform proposals and the reasons to be cautious about equity investments.  For example, the S&P
500 did not regain its 1968 value in real terms until 1983 (even including reinvested dividends),
and Japan￿s Nikkei index had fallen by 60 percent since 1989.  Moreover, a persuasive
explanation for why the return on stocks in the twentieth century was so much higher than the
return on bonds has never been given, raising concerns about whether this gap will persist in the
future.  Robert Rubin was particularly concerned about adding portfolio risk to the Social
Security system, and he argued that it would be a mistake to have Social Security benefits depend
on equity returns whether it was the trust fund or individuals doing the investing.  He worried
that the stock-market boom of the 1990s had erased people￿s memories of earlier periods such as
the 1970s during which stock prices did not rise at all, and reminded the economic team of the
Business Week cover story from 1979: ￿The Death of Equities?￿ 24 To be clear, the economic team nonetheless viewed risk as a significant downside of
plans that involved equities, a downside that needed to be weighed against the possible
advantages of equities.
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On balance, however, the economic team did not think that market risk was a sufficiently
important concern to rule out plans that involved equities, for several reasons.
24  First, steps
would have been taken to closely circumscribe the exposure of benefits to equity risk.  If
investment were undertaken, only a limited fraction of the trust fund would have been eligible for
investment in equities.  If individual accounts were part of the picture, they would have been
small add-on accounts with limited investment options.  Second, in the United States, even large
stock market declines have ultimately been more than made up for in subsequent rebounds.  For
example, the S&P 500 lost 85 percent of its value between September 1929 and June 1932, but
had returned to its 1929 level by the end of 1936.  Nevertheless, there was some concern that
there might not be sufficient political patience to remain invested in equities after a large market
downturn.  Third, although valuations were then very high relative to historic levels, a correction
during the next decade or so would be relatively unimportant for retirement benefits since total
equity holdings would not yet have grown very much.  Fourth, under the reform plans the
administration was considering, the existing Social Security payroll tax would still be allocated
entirely to the purchase of Treasury securities by the trust fund.  Only general revenue
contributions to the system would be invested in equities.  Thus, even in the unimaginable
circumstance in which all of the stock investments became worthless (in which case, the
solvency of Social Security would probably not be first on the list of the country￿s problems!), 
Social Security would be no worse off than under current law.  Fifth, the current Social Security
system already involves substantial risks, including the political risk that benefit rules will25 Indeed, research by Kent Smetters (2001) suggested that the contingent liability implicit
in such a guarantee might be essentially as large as the unfunded liability in the current system.
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change, the demographic risk that forecasts of mortality and fertility will be wrong, and the
economic risk that productivity growth will be higher or lower than currently projected. 
Introducing equities would add a new form of risk, and might increase the total amount risk, but
it would not be converting a currently riskless system into a risky one.  Nonetheless, the
economic team viewed market risk as a significant drawback of plans that involved equities, and
this drawback would need to be balanced against any potential benefits of such an approach.
The administration working group also analyzed policy options that could reduce the risk
faced by holders of individual accounts.  One problem was that individuals might shift out of
equities after a market decline, missing the recovery in equity prices.  Another problem was that
individuals who retired shortly after a substantial market drop￿and annuitized their account
balances based on those lower equity prices￿might believe it was unfair that workers who had
retired only shortly before were receiving much larger annuity payments.  Indeed, this perceived
unfairness might be acute even if the later retirees received higher annuities by investing in
equities throughout their working lives than if they had invested entirely in government bonds. 
This issue could be addressed, at least in part, by mandating gradual annuitization or investment
in variable-rate annuities, which would reduce the dependence of retirement income on equity
prices at a moment in time.  Another way to reduce risk would be a guarantee that each worker
would do at least as well as if he or she had invested in government bonds.  Yet, this approach
presented the danger that guarantees would induce people to take too much risk in their portfolios
or would simply represent a large contingent liability for the government.
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Political Interference in Markets and Corporate Governance
Although the administration working group thought that centralized investment in
equities had important advantages, the group also recognized that such investment had significant
potential disadvantages.  Chief among these was that government ownership of private financial
assets raised difficult issues of corporate governance and potential political interference in capital
markets.  
Under the Social Security reform proposals of Robert Ball and Henry Aaron and Robert
Reischauer, as much as 50 percent of the Social Security trust fund would be invested in equities. 
This holding would represent a large share of the U.S. stock market￿somewhere between 15
percent and 30 percent in 2030, depending on the relative growth rates of GDP and the stock
market.  Even with a smaller part of the trust fund invested in equities, the government could still
end up as the largest shareholder of many companies.  If political considerations influenced the
investment decisions of the trust fund, the efficiency of capital markets in allocating resources
could be degraded.  Certainly, the track record of state and local governments in the United
States as well as foreign governments around the world was sufficient to give one pause on this
issue.  It is not difficult to compile a sobering list of examples in which political intrusion had
materially reduced investment returns and arguably reduced the efficiency of various economies. 
Moreover, government ownership of equities might discourage the government from pursuing
other policies that could lower equity prices.  If the government were a major stockholder in
Corporation XYZ, would the Justice Department shy away from pursuing a meritorious anti-trust53
case against XYZ?  Or would the Environmental Protection Agency or Occupational Safety and
Health Administration refrain from enforcing their regulations against XYZ?
A related problem is how the government would exercise its rights as a shareholder to
choose corporations￿ managers and participate in business decisions.  Simply abstaining from
voting might not be an adequate strategy since it could effectively turn minority shareholders into
majority shareholders who would not necessarily look out for the interests of the other
shareholders.  In addition, voting rights may represent an important source of value in owning
equity; would the government be fulfilling its fiduciary responsibilities if it simply ignored that
source of value altogether? 
Some members of the economic team believed that these problems were not
insurmountable.  They argued that investments could be handled by an independent board
modeled after the Federal Reserve Board, with members chosen from the private sector and
charged with acting in the sole interest of trust fund beneficiaries.  Investments could be limited
to ￿widely used index funds,￿ in order to inhibit investments in index funds that excluded
particular firms engaged in some specified out-of-favor activity.  The private fund managers
could be chosen in a competitive process, instructed to vote proxies on behalf of the trust fund￿s
beneficiaries, and required to commingle the public money with the assets of their private clients.
Even still, future Congresses could alter such safeguards at any time, so developing a culture of
non-interference would be very important.
The working group also came to appreciate that many of these same issues would arise, to
at least some degree, under a system of individual accounts, especially to the extent that
investment choices were tightly constrained.  Indeed, most legislation proposing individual26 For example, the Archer-Shaw proposal discussed later required all individual accounts
to be invested in index funds with 60 percent equities and 40 percent bonds.  The Breaux-Gregg-
Kolbe-Stenholm plan limited investments to a small number of options similar to those in the
federal Thrift Savings Plan.
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accounts would put strict limits on investment choices; it was not hard to believe that political
interference might well affect the choices offered.
26  At the same time, individuals may be more
vigilant in policing deviations from return-maximizing investment policies for accounts that they
own personally rather than accounts that are held by the government￿and Congress may
therefore be more constrained in deviating from performance-maximizing choices with regard to
such accounts.  For example, the Thrift Savings Plan is a defined-contribution plan for federal
employees that has existed for years without political interference.
Redistribution
A central principle for the administration was that Social Security reform should not
reduce the extent of redistribution in Social Security from high-income households to low-
income households.  In particular, the administration believed that reform should help the
demographic groups that are most dependent on Social Security for staying out of poverty, such
as elderly women who are widowed, divorced, or never married.  Indeed, Gene Sperling argued
that any negotiations with Congressional Republicans about individual account plans should be
limited to only those plans that would result in a more progressive system overall than current-
law Social Security.
The most frequently proposed way of funding individual accounts was to make
contributions proportional to an individual￿s earnings, such as two percent of earnings.  Because27 With mandatory annuitization at a single price, ￿two percent accounts￿ would appear to
redistribute from poor to rich, because the rich tend to live longer.  However, the overall
distributional impact of such a plan depends on the source of the contributions.  If the funding is
generated from a progressive source like the personal income tax, then even accounts funded
proportionally to earnings can be progressive.
28 Contributions would likely be limited to workers with at least a threshold amount of
earnings in the year (perhaps the amount that would qualify a worker for four quarters of Social
Security coverage, currently around $3000).
29 See Feldstein and Liebman (2001) and Liebman (2001) for further discussion.
30 Of course, there are many other redistributive formulas that could be used.  For
example, contributions could equal ten percent of the first few thousand dollars of earnings, five
percent of the next few thousand dollars, and a smaller percentage of additional earnings.
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this approach would provide no redistribution to lower-income workers, the administration
working group studied other options for funding individual accounts.
27  One approach was to use
the projected budget surpluses to fund equal-dollar contributions to each worker￿s account. 
Contributions of $300 per worker had roughly the same aggregate cost as contributions of one
percent of payroll, so contributions of $600 would be a highly progressive alternative to
contributions of two percent of earnings.
28  Contributions equal to $300 plus one percent of
earnings would come very close to replicating the redistribution in the current Social Security
system.
29  In April 1998, Newt Gingrich proposed using the surplus to give every American a tax
cut in the form of an equal-dollar contribution to a ￿Social Security Plus￿ individual saving
account; thus, there was some hope that a plan along these lines could receive bipartisan
support.
30
An alternative to funding individual accounts in a redistributive manner would be to
make the traditional system more redistributive at the same time that non-redistributive
individual accounts were introduced.  This approach was used in the Breaux-Gregg-Kolbe-31 Women and Retirement Security, available at www.ssa.gov/policy/pubs/womenrs.html.
32 Providing earnings credits for time spent out of the labor force raising children
implicitly values that time the same regardless of a woman￿s earnings level.  In contrast, the more
traditional proposal to provide ￿drop-out￿ years in the Social Security benefit formula implicitly
values the time of high-earning women more highly than the time of low-earning women.  Thus,
the new option was essentially a more progressive version of the traditional proposal.
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Stenholm plan.   The administration￿s economic team had serious concerns about this approach
because it would lower even further the return received by higher income people in the
traditional system, and thus run the risk of eroding support for a universal program.  
The working group also gave a great deal of attention to ways of reducing poverty among
elderly women.  Elderly women who are divorced, widowed, or never married now have poverty
rates around 20 percent, roughly twice the population-wide average.  An inter-agency process
developed a set of options for addressing this problem, and produced a report that was issued in
conjunction with a Presidential event on the importance of Social Security to women.
31  The
options included: increasing Supplemental Security Income (SSI) benefits; providing Social
Security earnings credits for years spent out of the labor force raising children; and offering a
new widow benefit equal to 75 percent of the benefit received by the married couple before the
deceased spouse passed away (capped at the benefit received by a worker with average
earnings).
32  These options were seen both as good policy and as a way to sweeten a Social
Security reform package, particularly one with individual accounts, for Congressional
Democrats. Although these proposals were never formally advanced by President Clinton,
versions of them were put forth later by Vice President Gore during his Presidential campaign.
Another important concern was to make sure that Social Security reform did not reduce
the income of Social Security disability beneficiaries.  Because the formulas for retirement57
benefits and disability benefits are linked, cuts to retirement benefits would generally reduce
disability benefits as well.  Yet, many disabled beneficiaries would not have had a chance to
accumulate significant individual account balances by the time they become disabled, so they
could not compensate for cuts to the traditional benefit using the proceeds of their individual
accounts in the same way that retirees could.  Therefore, the working group believed that any cuts
to traditional retirement benefits should not pass through to disability benefits; all of the reform
plans constructed by the group were scored under this assumption.
Potential Compromise Reform Proposals
The administration working group believed that there was more potential for substantive
consensus on Social Security reform than the heated rhetoric on the topic suggested.  Clearly, the
political challenge of achieving reform was immense, and the substantive gap among competing
proposals remained wide.  Nonetheless, the administration believed that the concept of using the
proceeds of fiscal discipline to help address the nation￿s long run fiscal challenges ￿ and
therefore to justify general revenue transfers to the Social Security trust fund ￿ had the potential
for bipartisan support. And on two of the most disputed issues￿whether investments in private
securities should be handled collectively or individually, and whether individual accounts should
be created as part of Social Security￿there was nearly a continuum of options, and proposals
from the left and the right seemed to be moving toward each other.
On the first issue, proponents of individual accounts had originally argued that investment
options should be completely unrestricted.  For example, Martin Feldstein had initially proposed
that individual accounts be funded through a tax credit and invested in any of the assets that are33 Clearly, an individual account system that allowed for bequests would have lower
average retirement benefits than a system that used the account balances of deceased workers to
supplement the retirement benefits of survivors￿unless additional resources were contributed to
the system.
34 In some of these plans, part of the Social Security payroll tax was diverted to individual
accounts, while general revenue was directed to the trust fund to make up for the diverted
monies.
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eligible for use in an IRA.  Yet, in response to concerns about administrative costs and naive
investors, the main Republican legislative proposals ended up restricting investment choices to a
few broad index funds.  Similarly, early plans for private investments by the Social Security trust
fund envisioned the government investing directly through a single large fund.  But as concerns
about government interference in markets were raised, proposals tended to set up independent
investment boards and to spread the investments across a number of private managers.  Thus, by
late 1998, alternative investment mechanisms appeared to be converging to some degree.
A similar convergence may have been occurring on whether individual accounts should
be part of Social Security.  Some Democrats argued that individual accounts had the potential to
create wealth for all Americans, provide choice for individuals, and allow for some bequests.
33 
Other Democrats were willing to consider supplementing Social Security benefits with
government-subsidized accounts targeted at low-income households.  At the same time, some
Republicans who had initially favored diverting a portion of the existing Social Security payroll
tax to individual accounts￿and then cutting the traditional benefit substantially￿turned to
proposals in which general revenue was used to fund individual accounts.
34  Indeed, there was a
growing understanding that reshuffling the revenue stream already dedicated to paying retirement
benefits would not help close the underlying financing gap, and that additional resources would35 It would also be possible to fund add-on accounts by requiring workers to make
mandatory contributions to these accounts above and beyond their current payroll taxes.  This
approach was taken in the Gramlich plan.
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be needed.  Moreover, some of the Republican proposals involved redistributive funding of
individual accounts.  Thus, by late 1998, there appeared to be the possibility for convergence
around using non-Social Security funds to make redistributive contributions to individual
accounts, contributions that might or might not bear any direct mechanical relationship to the
traditional Social Security system.
Three main types of Social Security reform plans occupied the ￿policy space￿ defined by
this possible convergence of views.  The first and simplest were add-on individual accounts like
those proposed by Edward Gramlich.  Under this approach, the entire existing Social Security
payroll tax would continue to be used exclusively for funding traditional Social Security benefits,
and benefit cuts and revenue raisers would be used to bring the system into financial balance.  At
the same time, general revenue would be contributed to individual accounts to compensate for
the reduction in the traditional benefit.
35
The second type of eligible plan was a so-called ￿clawback￿ plan, initially developed by
Martin Feldstein and Andrew Samwick.  Under this approach, general revenue from the budget
surplus would be contributed to individual accounts, and a significant share of the account
balances (possibly in excess of 75 percent) would be ￿clawed back￿ when workers reached
retirement in order to finance traditional Social Security benefits; individuals would receive the36 A typical proposed clawback rate was 75 percent, leaving 25 percent of the account
balances for individuals to consume directly.  The clawback can also be specified as a reduction
in Social Security benefits equal to some fraction of account withdrawals.  For example, a worker
might lose 75 cents of his or her traditional benefit for each dollar of retirement income from an
individual account. 
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remaining account balances directly.
36  House Ways and Means Committee Chairman Bill Archer
and his colleague Clay Shaw introduced a plan of this form.
The third type of possible consensus plan was a so-called ￿hybrid￿ plan that included both
trust fund investments in equities and the establishment of small individual accounts.  Some
analysts saw these plans as ￿splitting the difference￿ between the two sides in the political
debate.  In addition, this approach offered an interesting opportunity for addressing concerns
about government interference in markets: trust fund investments could simply mirror the
investment choices that individuals made in their own accounts.  This could be done through a
single fund that matched the aggregation of individuals￿ choices, or it could be done through
individual ￿mirror accounts￿ in the name of each worker that were invested on behalf of the trust
fund.  On the other hand, some analysts argued that the smaller individual accounts in hybrid
plans made little sense, because the fixed costs of administering the accounts would consume an
excessive fraction of the investment returns.
An important concern of the economic team was that a reform plan involving modest
individual accounts in the beginning might be a ￿slippery slope￿ toward total privatization.  Yet,
there was considerable disagreement about what sort of reform presented the greatest such risk. 
Some members of the team argued that a clawback approach would best preserve the existing
system, since nearly all of the retirement benefits would continue to be paid out through the
traditional defined-benefit formula.  From that perspective, a clawback plan could be viewed as a61
back-door way for the Social Security trust fund to invest in equities while leaving the
investment decisions to individuals rather than the government.  Other members of the economic
team argued that the clawback approach tied Social Security benefits too closely to individual
accounts, and that it would not be politically feasible to tax such a large portion of the accounts at
retirement.  Under this view, clawback plans were simply a way of building up sufficient assets
to make total privatization possible (and likely) at a later date.
More generally, the working group recognized that the details of reform proposals would
have a tremendous impact on their economic and social consequences￿and thus on the
acceptability of those proposals to the administration.  Thus, an ￿individual accounts￿ proposal
that was funded out of the existing payroll tax in a non-progressive manner with unrestricted
investment options and high administrative costs represented a completely different view of the
future than a proposal with a similar label but different funding source and account design. 
The 1999 State of the Union Social Security Proposal
Throughout 1998 the administration working group studied the analytic issues underlying
Social Security reform and constructed specific illustrative reform plans.  Briefings for President
Clinton covered not only the substantive issues detailed in the preceding pages, but also political
strategies for achieving bipartisan agreement on reform.  Options that were given some very
preliminary thought included: the ￿Andrews Air Force Base approach,￿ echoing the negotiations
over the 1990 budget deal, in which White House officials and the Congressional leadership were
sequestered in non-stop negotiations at the base just outside Washington, DC; the ￿spontaneous￿
emergence of a bipartisan piece of legislation from a moderate Democrat on the Senate Finance62
Committee, as had almost worked on tobacco legislation; and the formation of a commission
made up of key members of Congress and administration officials.
The administration also spent 1998 pursuing an active ￿external￿ strategy on Social
Security reform.  This effort included briefings for members of Congress, public education
efforts surrounding the three national Social Security forums, and preparation for the December
White House conference.  Congressional distrust of the administration￿s work on Social Security
reform ran very deep, in part because of the potentially momentous importance of the issue. 
Some Democrats doubted whether the administration had a bedrock commitment to preserving
Social Security in its current form to the greatest extent possible.  Congressional Republicans
were even less trusting of the administration, and they sought assurances that President Clinton
was serious about achieving bipartisan reform and not simply trying to trick Republicans into
taking an unpopular position on the issue that Democrats could then use to re-take control of the
Congress.  Indeed, when Archer and Shaw introduced a specific reform plan, some of their
Republican colleagues complained that they had fallen into the Clinton administration￿s trap.
In the end, President Clinton decided to pursue Social Security reform based on
bolstering the Social Security trust fund rather than on creating individual accounts.  The
President proposed transferring general revenue into the trust fund and investing a portion of the
transferred amounts in equities.  The equity investments would be restricted to never exceed five
percent of the total U.S. stock market.  This decision may have been influenced by the changing
political dynamic in late 1998, as the possibility that the President would be impeached came
clearly into view.  Whether the President would have pursued a different approach in the absence
of impeachment will never be known. 63
The other key decision that was made in the run up to the 1999 State of the Union address
was whether to stick with a unified budget framework or to switch to a budget framework that
allocated only the non-Social Security surplus.  The central advantage of the unified budget
framework was that there would be sufficient funds available not only to shore up Social Security
but also to extend Medicare solvency, provide for additional discretionary spending, and
establish progressive individual savings accounts outside of Social Security.  A key disadvantage
was that transferring a portion of the unified budget surplus to Social Security might be seen as
￿double counting.￿   In contrast, the on-budget approach would avoid the double counting
critique, but there would not be sufficient resources available for all of the non-Social Security
initiatives.  Moreover, it would be necessary to project on-budget deficits for some of the
individual years in the ten-year budget window.  Ultimately, the President decided to stick with
the unified budget approach to budgeting that had been the norm since the Johnson
Administration.
6.  Budget Surpluses: 1998 through 2000
During the final years of the Clinton administration, attention focused on the rapidly
rising budget surpluses and their appropriate disposition.  We review the economics and politics
of that budget debate in this section.
The 1999 State of the Union Budget Framework
In his 1999 State of the Union address, President Clinton built on the earlier strategy to
￿Save Social Security First￿ by proposing a specific budget framework for Social Security reform64
and long-term fiscal discipline.  This framework proposed an allocation of unified budget
surpluses.  In contrast with prevailing practice, this allocation extended over the unusually long
time frame of fifteen years because there were insufficient resources in the first ten years to
accomplish all of the President￿s objectives.  In line with the earlier strategy, all of the proposed
uses of the surpluses were conditioned on reforming Social Security.
  The proposed allocation of the unified surpluses was as follows:  First, 62 percent of the
surpluses were allocated to Social Security and 15 percent to Medicare.  Transfers in these
amounts would be made to the respective trust funds, and the associated budget resources would
be viewed as fully ￿used￿ and hence not available for other purposes.  Because the monies were
not needed by these programs to pay current benefits, they would be used predominantly to pay
down the publicly held debt of the Federal government, with a limited amount of the revenue
transferred to Social Security used to purchase equities.  The plan was projected to extend the
solvency of the Social Security trust fund to 2055 and the Medicare Part A trust fund to 2020.
Another 12 percent of the surpluses were allocated to create new Universal Savings
Accounts (USAs).  As the administration described in more detail later in the spring, the
accounts would involve an automatic contribution by the government for all workers earning less
than a specified amount, as well as a matching contribution also available to workers with
income below a certain threshold.  A primary motivation for these accounts was to serve as a
bridge between the proponents and opponents of introducing individual accounts into the Social
Security system.  On one hand, USAs gave the administration a means of promoting wealth
creation on a broad scale, and they signaled the President￿s willingness to discuss the appropriate
role of individual accounts in the U.S. retirement system.  On the other hand, the administration65
emphasized that the accounts would have been entirely separate from Social Security￿funded
from revenue outside the existing payroll tax, and having no implication for an account holder￿s
traditional Social Security benefits.  Indeed, to reinforce the separateness of USAs from Social
Security, and to ensure that USAs were not seen as undermining the existing private pension
system, the administration proposed that contributions to 401(k) plans would qualify for
government matching.  As it turned out, however, USAs never received serious legislative
consideration.
The budget framework also allowed for additional tax cuts for child care, long-term care,
school construction, and investment in economically depressed areas, but the cost of these
proposals was financed entirely by other revenue-raising provisions such as curtailing tax
subsidies and closing some tax shelters and other loopholes.  The final 11 percent of the
surpluses were allocated to military readiness and other spending.
Federal Reserve Chairman Alan Greenspan testified to Congress on the day after the State
of the Union address.  His prepared remarks concerned macroeconomic conditions and therefore
did not mention the President￿s proposals of the previous evening.  However, in the question-
and-answer session, he provided crucial support for transfers to the Social Security trust fund
while reiterating his strong opposition to government investment in private markets:
[Greenspan] endorsed President Clinton￿s proposal to let federal budget surpluses
accumulate by locking up most of the money in the Social Security and Medicare trust
funds.  But he attacked Mr. Clinton￿s plan to invest as much as 15 percent of the Social
Security trust fund in the stock market, arguing that it would be ￿virtually impossible￿ to
insulate investment managers from political influence.  ￿ Wall Street Journal66
Much of the media coverage focused on Greenspan￿s opposition to government ownership of
private equities.  Even so, these testimonies helped the administration build credibility within the
Beltway for the plan￿s central device for preserving a large fraction of the unified surpluses.
The proposed budget framework was also criticized on the grounds that it ￿double
counted￿ the projected Social Security surpluses.  As we discussed earlier, the unified surplus
equals the ￿off-budget￿ surplus (overwhelmingly the Social Security surplus) plus the ￿on-
budget￿ surplus (essentially, the surplus on the non-Social Security portion of the government￿s
operations).  The critics argued that the administration￿s plan for allocating unified surpluses was
transferring to Social Security some budgetary resources that had originated in the Social
Security system, and therefore had already been credited to the Social Security trust fund once. 
Consider, for example, the hypothetical case in which all of the unified surpluses originated in
Social Security.  In that case, a $1 surplus in the Social Security system would have increased the
trust fund balance by $1.62￿$1 as under current law, and an additional 62 cents from the
proposed transfers.  The administration responded that the budget debate in preceding decades
had been a debate about the unified budget, with an implicit￿though often unspoken￿objective
of balancing the unified budget.  By contrast, the administration now aimed to leave a unified
surplus.  If one accepted the administration￿s assertion that ￿business as usual￿ would have left
no unified surpluses, then the State of the Union plan generated incremental government saving,
and the budget framework simply proposed to allocate this incremental saving to Social Security. 
Republicans responded to the President￿s proposals by pledging to create a ￿lockbox￿ to
ensure that the Social Security surplus would be used to pay down debt.  In addition, they67
proposed to allocate the on-budget surplus primarily to a ten percent across-the-board tax cut and
increases in defense spending.
Balancing the Budget Excluding Social Security
Against a backdrop of the double-counting allegation and continued dramatic
improvement in budget projections, the administration significantly revamped its budget
framework for the Mid-Session Review (MSR) released in June 1999.  The new framework
proposed to balance the budget in each year exclusive of the operations of the Social Security
system.  The MSR projected that the on-budget account would run a surplus of $5 billion in fiscal
year 2000 if no policy changes were enacted; as it turned out, the on-budget account finished
fiscal year 1999 with a surplus of less than $1 billion, the first surplus by that measure in 40
years, and followed that with a surplus of more than $86 billion in fiscal year 2000.
The Logic
Social Security had been taken officially ￿off-budget￿ in 1983, and this action was
reaffirmed in the budget legislation of 1985 and 1990 (Koitz, 1998).  But none of this legislative
action was sufficient to redirect policy attention to the on-budget balance.  The key objective of
the administration and others who favored the MSR approach to budgeting was to refocus the
political conversation on the disposition of the on-budget surpluses.  This step would establish
the presumption that the Social Security surpluses would result in unified surpluses of at least the
same size on average, and thus be used to pay down public debt.  While the new framework37 One view is that the objective of balancing the on-budget account should be
complemented with the objective of putting the Social Security system into some form of long-
term actuarial balance.  Determining how to satisfy that second leg of the overall fiscal objective
would supply the answer as to how much prefunding we should be undertaking. 
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clearly had political value to the administration in potentially blocking Republican tax-cut
proposals, it was also motivated by economic policy considerations.
The administration￿s economic team viewed the MSR approach as significantly
improving the legitimacy of the Social Security trust fund as a mechanism for pre-funding the
government￿s future retirement-related obligations.  Under the old approach, in which the
implicit fiscal objective was to balance the unified budget, an incipient Social Security surplus
would tend to elicit either tax cuts or new spending.  Depending on the size of this offset, the net
result could be little or no government contribution to national saving, even though the balance in
the Social Security trust fund would have increased.  Thus, in the preceding fifteen years, Social
Security surpluses probably raised government saving by much less than 100 percent of the
accumulation in the trust fund.  In essence, the nation had been doing less to prepare itself for the
retirement of the baby-boom generation than one would have thought by looking at the rising
trust fund balance.
In contrast, the new approach implies that Social Security trust fund accumulations would
be backed, dollar-for-dollar, by government contributions to national saving.  By itself, the new
approach leaves open the question of how much pre-funding of future Social Security obligations
should be undertaken, but it provides much more assurance that the government is doing as much
pre-funding as it appears to be doing.
37  By bringing trust fund accumulations and increments to
government saving into alignment, the new framework took an important step toward ￿truth in69
government.￿  Put differently, this approach takes the ￿double counting￿ critique completely off
the table, because Social Security surpluses unambiguously would be ￿used￿ once and only once
(to pay down the debt held by the public).
The new framework also provided an organized context for executing general revenue
transfers into the Social Security trust fund.  Such transfers would be scored as an ￿expense￿ of
the on-budget account; if the accepted goal is to balance the on-budget account, then this expense
would reduce the resources available for other uses.  As a result, all accumulations in the trust
fund would be matched, dollar for dollar, by an incremental increase in government saving.  In
this budget framework, general revenue transfers to Social Security are not simply a paper
transaction, but generate true economic pre-funding of future obligations.  The administration
proposed sufficient transfers in the 1999 MSR to extend the solvency of the Social Security trust
fund to 2053.  To motivate a specific amount of those transfers, they were set equal to the interest
savings that would result from using the Social Security surpluses to pay down public debt rather
than cut taxes or raise spending.  The transfers would have begun in 2011 based on debt
reduction in the preceding decade.
The MSR plan did not fully resolve the difficulties with general revenue transfers,
because it left Medicare as part of the on-budget account while proposing to transfer general
revenue into the Hospital Insurance (Medicare Part A) trust fund.  Under traditional budget
scoring rules, the net effect of these transfers on the on-budget surplus would have been zero,
because the transfers would have appeared as both an outlay and a receipt.  To deal with this
problem, the administration adopted the obvious modification to the usual accounting
rules￿treating the transfers as a ￿full use￿ of those monies, and therefore as reducing the amount70
of on-budget surpluses available for other uses.  The proposed transfers were projected to extend
the solvency of the Medicare trust fund to 2027, by far the longest solvency horizon in the history
of the program.  However, no action was taken by the Congress to implement either the Social
Security or Medicare transfers.
The Lockbox
Because the details of national saving and budget accounting are not viewed as attractive
material for political messages, the new approach was proposed to be implemented through
creation of a Social Security ￿lockbox.￿  The lockbox was designed to create a mental picture of
a strong safe that would contain not only the current-law Social Security surpluses but also the
proposed general revenue transfers.  By placing these funds in a ￿lockbox,￿ the administration
meant to increase the public￿s assurance that those monies would be saved￿which in this
instance meant that they would be used to pay down debt held by the public.  The substance of
the lockbox consisted of a set of procedural hurdles that the Congress (and especially the Senate)
would have to overcome before the government could run a deficit in the on-budget account.
That said, the most important guarantor of the new framework is something more
amorphous￿specifically, the terms of the political debate.  So long as the political debate
focuses on the disposition of the on-budget surpluses, the procedural hurdles underlying the
lockbox probably will not come under serious challenge.  But if the consensus changes, the
Congress will find ways around those hurdles.  Thus far, the political consensus appears to be
holding, and it remains politically dangerous to ￿dip into the Social Security surpluses.￿ 71
However, it is far from certain that this consensus will continue to hold if the on-budget account
returns to deficit.
A critical factor that smoothed the way to shifting the focus of the budget debate was the
ongoing improvement in the fiscal situation.  After the budget stringency that had been required
to balance the budget on a unified basis, there would have been little appetite for balancing the
on-budget account if doing so would have entailed substantial additional pain.  That said, it
would be a mistake to underestimate the discipline that was required to achieve the higher
standard.  At every step of the way, the opportunity cost in terms of foregone tax cuts and
additional spending was keenly felt.
Congressional Republicans generally embraced the shift in budget objective toward
balancing the on-budget account, but they rejected President Clinton￿s proposed disposition of
the projected on-budget surpluses.  In the MSR plan, the President allocated these resources to
transfers to Social Security and Medicare, new spending (especially a Medicare drug benefit),
and a limited set of tax cuts.  The framework also incorporated a comprehensive reform of
Medicare, which is discussed in greater detail by Newhouse (this volume).  All told, the debt held
by the public would have been paid off, on a net basis, by 2015 under the President￿s plan.  In
contrast, Congressional Republicans continued to place much greater emphasis on tax
reduction￿at one point proposing that the entire projected on-budget surpluses be devoted to a
tax cut, and providing no new resources for either Social Security or Medicare.
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During its last year the Clinton administration framed its fiscal policy around the goal of
eliminating the debt held by the public.  Treasury Secretary Summers explained the logic of this
objective in a May speech.  First, Summers argued, paying down the debt ￿will maximize
investment at a time when the reward for investing is especially great.￿  Summers piggybacked
on the observation of Alan Greenspan that the return to investment appeared to be historically
high, and therefore that the opportunity cost of failing to invest also was historically high. 
Second, paying down the debt ￿will help to increase supply in our economy, rather than
demand.￿  The economy was then operating beyond its normal productive capacity, and even the
administration￿s own economic projection showed a gradual upward drift in the unemployment
rate over the succeeding few years.  Against that backdrop, many analysts believed that fiscal
policy should aim to increase aggregate supply by adding to the available pool of capital, rather
than fueling aggregate demand.  Third, a failure to pay down debt ￿is likely to exacerbate the
U.S. trade deficit.￿  The size of the trade deficit may just have reflected the relative economic
strength of the United States and its major trading partners.  But it was one of the few economic
imbalances at the time, and the moment seemed inopportune for a more expansionary fiscal
policy that might appreciate the dollar, reduce foreign demand for our goods and services, and
increase our demand for theirs.  Fourth, Summers said, a failure to pay down debt ￿will reduce
our capacity to meet the demographic challenges ahead.￿  Summers strongly endorsed the view
that the most important preparation the federal government could make for the retirement of the
babyboom generation was to improve its fiscal position, thereby increasing national saving and
expanding the productive capacity of the economy.  And finally, ￿the current strength of our
economy and budget, combined with the enormous uncertainty attached to budget projections,73
make this a time when we should be prudent in our commitments.￿  Summers argued implicitly
that it was preferable to be too cautious rather than too aggressive in extrapolating recent
economic performance.
In line with this view, the administration￿s budget framework released in early 2000 was
aimed at preserving fiscal discipline.  The projected Social Security surpluses were again
protected in a ￿lockbox,￿ and the administration again proposed that general revenue be
transferred to the Social Security trust fund and added to the ￿lockbox.￿  These transfers would
begin in 2011 based on the interest savings from debt reduction between 2000 and 2010. 
Roughly $300 billion in general revenue would be transferred to the Medicare trust fund over ten
years and used for debt reduction.  The remaining on-budget surplus was divided into nearly
$200 billion of additional spending for a prescription drug benefit for Medicare beneficiaries and
health insurance coverage for low-income Americans, and more than $250 billion of tax cuts
focused on retirement saving, marriage penalty relief, educational opportunities, community
revitalization, affordable health care, and tax simplification.
In June the administration announced another upward revision to the baseline budget
surpluses over the next ten years, this time in the amount of $1.3 trillion.  The Mid-Session
Review proposed the next step toward shoring up the conceptual foundations of the budget by
taking Medicare out of the budget in the same way that Social Security was out of the budget. 
Accordingly, the MSR allocated baseline surpluses over the following ten years excluding both
Social Security and Medicare.  The administration maintained its policies on Medicare reform,
health coverage, and targeted tax cuts, and set aside $500 billion as a ￿reserve for America￿s38  Notable changes to the Social Security earnings test did occur during this decade.  The
earnings test reduces or eliminates benefit payments to beneficiaries with income from work that
exceeds a threshold amount. These beneficiaries subsequently receive higher benefits to
compensate them for the withheld benefits. Legislation in 1996 significantly raised the level of
earnings that would trigger benefit reductions.  Legislation in 2000 eliminated the earnings test
altogether for beneficiaries who are at or above the normal retirement age (currently 65 years and
two months and scheduled to increase to 67 by 2022).  See Gruber and Orszag (2000) for an
overview of the impact of the earnings test on labor supply and benefit receipt.
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future.￿  Even if all of these funds were used for spending increases or tax reductions, the debt
held by the public was still projected to be paid off, on a net basis, by 2012.
The Congress did not adopt the central features of this budget framework.  Neither Social
Security nor Medicare reforms were enacted.
38  Although no fewer than five ￿lock box￿ bills to
set aside both the Social Security and Medicare surpluses passed the Republican-controlled
House between 1999 and 2001, none were passed by the Senate and therefore no legislation
taking Medicare out of the budget (which would have given it the same treatment as Social
Security) was ever enacted.
Just working out the annual appropriations bills proved an especially arduous
undertaking: a succession of continuing resolutions kept the government functioning after the
beginning of the new fiscal year on October 1, and the final bills were not approved until
December 15.  President Clinton announced the administration￿s final set of budget projections
in late December.  Based on these projections, the debt held by the public could be eliminated on
a net basis by 2010.
A National Asset39 In some very limited respects, the Federal government already holds private assets.  For
example, the Treasury maintains cash balances in commercial banks, the Thrift Saving Plan
holds equities on behalf of its individual beneficiaries, and the Pension Benefit Guarantee
Corporation holds private assets in part as legacies from retirement plans that have been turned
over to it.  However, these current holdings are dwarfed in size by the investments that might be
conducted on behalf of the Social Security trust fund or the central government.
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Toward the end of the Clinton administration, the possibility of eliminating the debt held
by the public became increasingly realistic.  The arithmetic associated with this possibility is
straightforward: if the on-budget account is kept in balance over the next ten to fifteen years, the
Social Security surpluses will be enough to pay down the entire pubic debt.  Beyond that point,
the continued Social Security surpluses that are now projected would transform the Federal
government from a net debtor to the rest of the economy into a net creditor.  In other words, the
government might become a net holder of private assets.
39  The Clinton administration
recognized this possibility, but did not wrestle with the associated policy issues at any great
length. 
Indeed, under current projections, the accumulation of assets is likely to begin even
sooner than the basic math suggests.  First, part of the debt held by the public is in forms that
would be difficult or unpopular to retire.  For example, there are roughly $200 billion in
outstanding savings bonds, and this program￿which provides a convenient savings vehicle
especially for low- and moderate-income households￿seems unlikely to be terminated in the
name of increasing national saving.  Second, part of the debt is scheduled to mature well after the
debt would be eliminated on a net basis.  Some portion could be bought back before its scheduled
maturity date, but at some unknown point, the holders of this long-term debt might demand an40 The extent of this problem depends on the Treasury Department￿s debt issuance policy
from here forward.  Already, there has been considerable speculation in the financial press that
Treasury￿s 30-year bonds might be discontinued because new bonds of that maturity would
extend so far beyond the currently projected debt-elimination date.
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increasing premium in order to give it up.
40 In sum, the debt elimination date is only about a
decade away, assuming that Social Security surpluses materialize as projected and continue to be
used to pay down debt.
Accumulation of private financial assets by the Federal government raises all of the same
issues regarding corporate governance and potential political interference in capital markets that
arise when considering whether to invest part of the Social Security trust fund in private assets. 
Indeed, some have argued that the dangers are even greater in this situation, since the Social
Security trust fund is at least somewhat removed from the political process and is intimately
linked with a popular cause and powerful lobby.  In general, the same potential solutions to these
problems pertain.  The federal government could attempt to set up a neutral, nondistortionary
method of investing the surplus monies in the private market, running all the risks that would be
inherent in that approach.  Alternatively, the Social Security trust fund could invest in private
securities, thereby commensurately increasing the amount of government debt in private hands. 
Still another possibility is that individual accounts might be used to preserve some of the saving
inherent in the projected surpluses, while reducing (though not avoiding altogether) the
governance and political interference concerns associated with centralized investment.  Finally,
increases in spending or larger tax cuts obviously could eliminate unwanted asset accumulation,
though at the sacrifice of some or all of the potential government contribution to national saving. 
Such a return to balancing the unified budget instead of the budget excluding Social Security41 If there were more than one potential successor to Treasury debt, the market might
eventually ￿tip￿ to one or the other in order to gain the extra efficiency associated with maximum
depth and liquidity in a single market.
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would also break the link between government saving and the accumulation in the Social
Security trust fund, impairing the validity of that fund as a signal of the preparation that the
nation is undertaking for the retirement of the baby-boom generation.
The current long-term outlook for fiscal policy also raises questions with regard to the
social value of Treasury debt.  In particular, a number of commentators have pointed out that the
existence of a deep and liquid market for Treasury securities has provided significant benefits to
U.S. capital markets.  For example, Treasury securities have served as pricing benchmarks for
other debt instruments, meaning that prices and yields on corporate and other securities are often
quoted relative to Treasury securities rather than in absolute terms.  In addition, Treasury
securities have been seen as convenient vehicles for hedging interest-rate risk.
Yet, it is not evident whether these functions require the existence of Treasury debt per se
or simply the existence of some debt market that is very deep and very liquid.  Indeed, as market
participants have come to recognize the possibility of at least a substantial paydown of Treasury
debt (even if not total elimination), there has been substantial market innovation.  Alternative
instruments are now vying for the role that has been played by Treasury securities; where this
process will lead is unclear, especially because the market may dictate that there is room for only
one successor rather than many.
41  Thus, the current situation leaves open the question of whether
a large market for Treasury securities provides some benefit for the economy that: (a) cannot be
provided by any private issuer, (b) can be provided more efficiently by the Federal government,
or (c) represents a valuable monopoly franchise that should be provided by the Federal42  Larry Lindsey is the only person we are aware of who predicted this transformation. 
His 1990 book, The Growth Experiment contains a chapter titled ￿The Great Surplus of ￿99."
43 See http://www.cnn.com/2000/US/09/07/debt.clock/
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government so that taxpayers can reap the financial rewards rather than private monopolists. 
Quantifying the benefits of a deep and liquid Treasury market is very difficult.  Moreover, those
benefits must be weighed against the costs of either less saving or the holding of private assets by
the government.  Indeed, if the social value of government debt is great enough, it could even be
optimal for the government to gross up its balance sheet by issuing extra debt and purchasing
private assets simply to maintain a viable debt market.
7. Conclusion
The 1990s were marked by an unexpected turn-around in the U.S. fiscal situation as a
seemingly intractable budget deficit problem gave way to large budget surpluses.
42  A potent
symbol of the improvement in the fiscal situation over the decade was the announcement on May
13, 2000 that the ￿debt clock￿ in New York￿s Times Square would be dismantled in September
2000, essentially for lack of interest.
43  The tax increases and spending discipline imposed by the
1990, 1993, and 1997 budget deals played a significant part in this improvement in the budget
picture, as did the restraint of the Congress and the President from enacting tax cuts or spending
increases that would have dissipated the incipient surpluses.  But good luck in the form of a
strong economy also was important.  And the impact of the initial policy decisions on the
subsequent economic performance should not be discounted.79
While the Clinton Administration￿s fiscal policy helped to bring the budget deficit under
control and reduce the level of debt to GDP from 50 percent down to 35 percent, the
Administration was only partially able to lock in fiscal discipline for the future.  The consensus
that emerged in 1999 to pay down debt with the Social Security surplus will, assuming the
consensus holds,  ensure that the debt to GDP ratio continues to fall steadily for the next decade. 
But the Administration￿s attempts to preserve the budget surpluses to help solve the entitlement
problem ended in failure as it took the subsequent Administration less than six months to
dissipate much of the surpluses by passing a large consumption-oriented tax cut.  Given the
magnitude of the long-run fiscal imbalance and of the budget surpluses that could potentially
have been allocated to address this problem, a significant opportunity to prefund future
retirement and health benefits was missed.80
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Table 1
The Turnaround in the Federal Budget

















1986 -5.0 17.5 19.4 39.6 7.9 6.2 10.5
1987 -3.2 18.4 18.6 40.6 8.4 6.1 10.2
1988 -3.1 18.1 18.2 40.9 8.0 5.8 10.1
1989 -2.8 18.3 18.1 40.5 8.2 5.6 10.2
1990 -3.9 18.0 18.6 42.0 8.1 5.2 10.9
1991 -4.5 17.8 19.0 45.4 7.9 5.4 11.8
1992 -4.7 17.5 19.0 48.2 7.7 4.9 11.5
1993 -3.9 17.6 18.5 49.5 7.8 4.5 11.2
1994 -2.9 18.1 18.1 49.4 7.8 4.1 11.3
1995 -2.2 18.5 17.5 49.2 8.1 3.7 11.2
1996 -1.4 18.9 17.2 48.5 8.5 3.5 11.1
1997 -0.3 19.3 16.5 46.0 9.0 3.3 10.9
1998 0.8 19.9 16.3 42.9 9.6 3.1 10.8
1999 1.4 20.0 16.1 39.7 9.6 3.0 10.7
2000 2.4 20.6 15.9 34.7 10.2 3.0 10.5
Source: CBO (2001).  85
Table 2























































Notes.  Revisions are from January to January of the years shown.  Decomposition is by the
CBO, cumulated by the authors across projection updates.  Percentages apply to the total










Figure 1: Federal Budget Surplus : 1946 - 2000
(percent of GDP)







Figure 2: Debt Held by the Public: 1946 - 2000





















where source was not
reported by the CBO.


































Figure 5: Net National Saving and its Components
(percent of GDP)
Private and state and local government saving
Federal government saving
National saving